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CHAPTER I
ntTRoDUCTION

The year 1951 has bee'n called the yeer of' conf"_lsion.
Many people attacking both the entire recent foreign policy of
the United States and the United Nations t methods 1n Korea. hs.ve

branded each with the stigma of CONFUSION.

The Truman-MacArthur

controversy has only perplexed neople more.

The Kefauver inves-

tigation ot ol'ga..'11zed ism1)ling '1J1 thin the borders of Jmerica has

so ar(Jused ,ubl1c opinion that the whole nation is wondering wha1
the cO!.ll'plete story 1s.

More recently crime investigations o.f

large-scale dope pedcUing, million-dollar narcotic rings, and
soandals among pu.blic officers hav€" left the man on
beT(ildered..

confused about the issues at
ground nsight be for
Commllni~ts ~d

many reports,

street

Even as this chapter is bein.g wr1 tten, tru.ce talks

are bfQinl inaug'l.1rs.ted in. Korea.

the

th~

.50

!l

The

It~ke,

av~rage

cl tizen 1.9 still

wondering ..,yhat thE? common

lasting negot.iated pee.ce in Kores. t'etiNeen

oU.rselves.

There are so many opinions, so

much. conject.ure- 8.nd uncertainty, is it e.ny won ...

der that we are confused?

We seem to have lost sight of snythinl

absolute or ul time.te on wh1ch to base our judgements.
If 'Je look

8.t seme

of the modern vie¥.'s of God, V'ie

1

CM-

2

not help getting the impression of confusion here too. •God is
everything from a universal world spirit to a poor suffering being who needs our help as 'Jell as our pity.

Atheism, pantheism,

deIsm, personalism, f1nItism, and a host of other "isms"--all
with dirferent viewpoints of God, all with their staunch defenders!
about

As we consider these two types of confusion, about God an
pres~t-day

world situations, the thought strikes us that

they seem like two manifestations of the sInne root, two effects
of the same causes.

This is not surprising.

Our confusion aboll

what man 1s and what our relation to our fellow man is, reflects
our confusion about what God is and what our relation to Him 1s.
One of the more popular beliefs in modern times, the
one to which our present study is devoted, is theistic finitism.
This is Simply the belief that God is finite,

8. S. Laurie in

his two volume work, §xnth§tic8, has lett us a modern uhilosophe
faced "lith an ancient problem.

La.urie enccunters the nroblem

or

the meaning 0t evil, and he asks an old question. "How is Evil
possible if' God be One, All.... powerful, and 0004,"1 Laurie defines
evil as "the tailure of God-creative to realize the ideal of the
individual and of the whole
cu~ies,ft2

.{

~

!h! ulaQ! £t

B~1n,

which m!n 00-

Because there is evil in the world, beoause there are
1

S. S. Laurie,· Imthetlc!, II, New York, 1906, 28,.

2

l..12JJ1., 286.

• 811flaws in the universe, Laurie concludes that Ood cannot be
powerf.ul; He must be finite.

God has a lot of good will, tries

hard, but often fails.
Does God truly fail? Our answer must be, Assuredly: and
the failure is more consoicuous, the higher the grade of
finite being. I think it 1s Epietetul who says that God
doe. not "take aim tor the RUlRose of miSSing the mark",
but without doubt, here and now, the m.ark is constantly

missed.'

John McT. Ellis McTaggart is another Twentieth Century
representative of the theory of a limited God.
theory grows out of the problem of time.

With him the

He claims there can be

no causal relation betw4en two substances, one or both of which

is out ot time.

He illustrates the point by imagining there ex.

ists a timeless God.

Such a God, however, cannot be the cause of

In fact, between such a God and the world there can

the world.

be no causal rela.tion at a11. 4 McTaggart treats of the problem
of

at

Tinite God is some detail in his book The Nature gJ: Existenci

especially 10 a chapter of the second volume entitled MGod and
Immortality."

There McTaggart gives us his definition of God:

I take the word God to mean a b~lng who is nerson!.l"
supreme,and good. Personality is the quality €If being
a selt •••• In including supremacy in the definition of the
quality of deity, I do not mean that&. being should not
he called a God, unless he is omnipotent, but that he must

.!

3

lli1l.,

287 •

4. John KeT. Ellis McTaggart I Phi1osophj.Cll S,tug1es
London, 1934, 170.

t

•

4

be, at the least, much more powerful than any other self,
and 80 powerful ~hat his volition can affect profoundly all
else that exists. In including goodness, I do not mean
that a being should not be called a God unless he is morall
perfeg~t) but t~t he must be, at the least, more good than
evil.
McTaggart is not unaware that most of the theists believe that
God is omnipotent, the creator ot all else that exists" end absolutely pe~fect.6

Even so, McTaggart sticks to his position

and does not hedge even when he says that he is doubtful that
his God is of much religious value.?

This is what McTaggart un.

derstands by God, but does he actually hold that such a God exists?

He claims there seems no reason why there should not be

such a person as _his God.

On the other hand, there seems no rea-

son why there should be such a person.

So McTaggart ooncludes.

"Our conolusions invalidate the usual, and the- strongest argu...
8
menta tor the existence of such a beine."
There oannot be much
doubt, then, as to MeTaggart'. real position.

God -for him means

a finite God) but when it comes to the-aotual existence of this
finite God, McTaggart is really-an atheist, or at least an agnostic. 9
'.
5 John MeT. Ellis McTaggart, l:.tl! NAture 9.t.
qambr1dge,
1927, 176.
II"

. j:

6

Ibid., 177.,

7

~.,'- 1S,.

g

l.1UJ1., 134.

9

~.

~~sttng"

5
Rashdall in his book The Th,gry 2!

Hast~ngs

Evil also donsiders tbe finiteness of God.

~ ~

He meets the same

diffioulty occasioned by the existence of evil.

It is

h~s

be-

lief that evil must be supposed. to exist a,s the necessary means
to good!OThls fact, Rashdall is foroed to admit, implies a limi.
tation to d1vine Qmn1potenee. 11 He thus explains that evil is
due to a limitation of God's power rather than to a limitation
of His geodneS!1.

'gain we see, and we shall see 1t .in even gl"eat

er detail later in this thes!s, that the whole question of good
and evil 1s intimately bound up with the theory of God.s finiteI

ness.

Le1lis R. Farnell in the following passage has su:mm.arized

well the position of

Rashdal~.

God created souls, eveJl, the bad soul, and the best ,;orld
he could, beeaus.e he is finite and could create only what
was ;1n his nature to create, and he has often to do evil
as a means to good: there 1s in the ultimate natu,re of'
things, that is to say, the ultimate nature of 004--. an
inherent reason why greater good should not bEt obt~inabl••12

The idea that God is both one and finite appears rather
la~e

in history as a popular belief'.

It is true that the ancient

Greeks and Romans as well as all the gentiles had a sort of' hier10 Hastings R./Bhdall, The Theoa 9l. ~ .InS. 1!1l..
Oxfotd, 1907, 235.
11

,rug,.,

237 •

. !:
12 Lewis Richard Fa.rnell, :the Attr!but!§ !2t. Gog,
Oxford, 1925, 27Q.

6
archy of.&2S!.1.

•

.All these .&2!l!, indeed, w()uld have to be consid-

ered finite.
in

8

Some commentators would hold that Plato believed
finite God. 13 The notion of God, however, which 'was in-

herited from the Jewish race and preserved and expounded

through~

out the Chrlstia.n centuries had always been the one,14 simple, 1S
eternal,16 infinite,17 perfeet,18 good19 God of St. Thomas and ,

the other scholastics.
omnipotent

'''8S

To make God finite or anything less tha,n

to destroy the whole notion of God.

POI'

longcen-

turies Christian Western civ1lization adored a God both infinite

in power and infinite in goodness.

In recent centuries, however,

there has arisen this belief in a finite God.

In vlevring briefl,

this change from the notion of an infinite God to that of a fi.

nite God, it will be well to consider

tr~$e

influences, David

Hume_ John Stuart Mill, and William James.
In his "tfork, Dialogy.es Q}mcern1ns NaturAl

R'11g~9n,

published a.fter his death, DaVid Hume makes mention 1n passing

13 Edgar Sheffield Brightman, A PhilosonhY Q! Religion,
New York, 1945, 289 •

1.4 .Q. Q.. I I I 42 •
1; 1· 1-, I, 3, 7.
16 St.. !i." I, 15.
.

{-;

17

~.,

18
19

1- 1-, I, 4, 1.

a.,
- -c.

43 •

I, 38.

of the theory that God is finite.
first treatises to
mentioned.

ap~ear

7
•

The Dialogues is one of the

in English where this theory 1s even

The D1ilggues take place between PhIlo, Cleanthes,

8.nd Demea; however, it is never entirely clear which of these is

speaking Hume's true mind.

Norman Kemp Smith in his edition of

the J21.aJ,ogue,20 identIfies Hume with Philo.

Most of the previous commentators had taken Cleantha. for the real Hume. 21 Be
this as it may .. both seem to subscribe at times to the idea of
God's finiteness.

It is Cleanthas in Part XI of the

PlI1ggU~'

who makes the suggestion.
But supposing the Author of nature to be finitely perfact
though far exceeding mankind; a satisfactory aCcollOt may
then be given of natural and moral eVils, and every untowar~
phenomenon be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then
be ehosen. in order to reach & desirable end: And in a
word, benevolence, regulated by wisdom .. and limited by 22
necessity, may produce just such a, world as the present.
Hume's characters themselves make it sufficiently clear that
their author realized the novelty of this idea of a finite God.
SpeaJting to Philo, Cleanthes says that "he '''ould gladly hear, at
length, v,ithout interruption, your opinion of this new theorJ. n2 '

20 Norman Kemp Smith, H~efS
NaturAl Rt11giQn, Oxford, 1947, 2 •

D~a.J,ogyel

Concerning

21

Brightman, A fll!loso;')hy: 2! Rillgion, 29.3.

22

Smith, Rgme's plalogu§s Concerning Nitural Religion

2.3

Ibig_ Emphasis is mine.

20~h

Philo a.nswers that there are fOlIr circumstances on

which the greater part of the ills that beset sensible creatures
dsnend.

Because of these assorted evils

universe, Philo cannot see a ground for

tr~t

are present in the

inrerrl~1g

there exists

Ii

)(

divine goodness.

He claims that i,r infinity is e"cluded from the

divine attributes" we may be able to
to the goodness of God.

Sh011f

a consistence ":lointing

However, these conjectures ab(:ut God's

good'ness can never be foundations for any inference that God
a.ctuB,lly is good. 24 Although Philo's real posl tlon seems to be
that of a skeptic,25 he tries at times to champion the cause of
God's finiteness.

Thus in Chapter V he argues against Cleanthes

with somewhat cuestionab1e logic.
be

?roporti,~tned

to the effect.

we know it, is not infinite.

The cause, he says, ought to

The effect, however, as far as
How, then, ca,n we ascribe infinity

to the. Divine Being whioh is the oause?26

Yet in almost the next

line Philo is favoring the cause of an infinite God.
such a God must be A

Proof for

nrtart'

There are many inexplioable difficulties in the works of
nature, 'Which, if we allow a perfect Author to be')roved
A priori, are easily solved, and become only seemingly
difficulties, from the narrow capaCity of man, who cannot
24 1.:tWl., 205.

25 l.b!s1., 213.
·1

26 !W., 166.

9

trace infinite relations. 27
Hums's position, then, vlith regard to the theory of a
finite God, was that of the first English draftsman.

he was one oltha .first men to sketch
outlines of this dootrine.

in

Certainly

the English language th

As 'we have already mentioned, Hume's

D1:alogyel was a posthumous work nublished in 1779.

Much of

Humets thought was already suspect among the English readers of
his' day, and it may be that he thought mentioning this new theor
o.r a finite God during his lifetime would only antagonize them.

We can agree essentia.lly with Julius 8. Bixler's c01mllent on
Rums's contribution to the finite God theory.
Hume in his essay on lla IfJj;ut&l Hi§t2tX $.?I. Re1t,1on observes ths.t theism develo'ped out of polytheiSm. ~y increasin
"adulation". That is to say, men vied with each other in
ascribing greatness to the Deity until he finally became a.
great as their words could make him. And in the D:1.alogue,
C9ncernlng Iffl.tllral Elliston, he hints that absolutism may
have come about in much the same way, and tha.t both philosophy and religion would be better off if the conception
of an infinite God were superseded by tlta more accurate and
moderate. idea. 25
The first man of really great significance to develop
tha.::.t rough, sketchy outline of Hume's was John Stuart M:ill.
was nearly one hundred years a.fter the appearance of the Dil-

27

~.,

166 •

. !;
28 Julius Seelye Bixler, ReJ.!gion 1!! thE! Ph11gsoPllv
gt W1l1!tm Jiltl. Boston, 1926, 140.

It

10

-logue~ of flume
w~~s

8-

(1779) that Mill's three EstiY! 2n Ballgion (1874)

published.

We m1ght remark in passing that this, too, was

-postlnlmOU8 vrork.

Mill rejects the argument for the existence

of God trom the necessity ot a first cause,29 also the one from
)0
the general consent ot mankind,
as well as all.!. prior2, ;:Iroofs,
v:hatever particular form they ta.ke.,l

About the proa;t" for God ts

existence from the marks of design in the universe, Mill caution
11 admits:

It must be allowed that in the present state of our knowledge, the ada?tations in Nature afford a large balance
of )robability in favor of creation by intelligence. It
is equally oertain that this is no more than probabl1ity.,2
Talking about this same proof from deSign, Mill states in !lnothe
plaoe that a very little consideration is enough to show that 3)
"though it

nBS

some force, its force is very generally overrated •

It 1s necessary, first of Bll, to understand what Mill
says about nature if lIe are to try to understand his thinking on

the problem of God.
~

In the first ot his Three Esspys

Mill takes for his subject "Nature."

John Stuart Mill, Three Es§al~ gn

)0

Ib14., 160.

31 . Ibid.. , 16,3.
. f·;

He concludes that the

29

York., 187,4, 153.

32

~.,

3)

X:t!J.d., 16S.

174.

.2lllllll-

Bft1tgton,

New

11

• of
'Word nature denotes two things, either "the entire system

things" or "things as they v;ould be, apart from human 1:ntervention."34

In the first sense, the doctrine that man ought to fol-

low nature is unmea.ning, since man cannot do anything else than
follow nature.
that

m~l

In ,the second sense of the term, the doctrine

ought to tollow nature is irrational and immoral.

If

mall followed nature, for example, if he lived like the anima.ls,
he ,wuld 1I1'Ound, kill, and devour other men as well as other ani-

mals.

This is what seems to be in the ba.ck ot

M11~'s

mind

he says that to follow nature is irrational end immoral.'S

llrhen

In

this section of his essay-there seems to be no indication that
there might be an essential distinction between man and brute,
animal and rational animal.)6
then man could follow nature,

If such a distinction wer~ made,
~

nature, and thus not act like

a brute beast.
For Mill, the evils of nature are a tremendous dirf1.
culty.

The terror of a hurricane, the destruction of a flight

or locusts

or a flood,'7

the fact that "a large proportion of

all animals should pass their existence in tormenting and devour-

. li

34

Iblg., 6.4_

)5

~.,

65.

l.J2.M\., 55-65.
37 ..l.l21a., 30 ..
36

t

12
•

ing other animals, ,,38 that these a,nimals "have been lavishly
fitted out with the instruments necessary tor that -purpose; their
strongest instincts impel' them to it, and many of them seem to
have been constructed incapable of supporting themselves by any
other food."39.- all these0henomena bewilder Mill.

Theonly

answer to these difficulties he sees in the fact that God must
be finite.

"If we are rlOt obliged to believe the animal creation

to be the work of a demon, it is because

to have been made by

Ii

~e

need not suppose it

Being of infinite power. lt40

This, th.en,

is where Mill's consideration of nature has'led him, namely, tG
Ii

finite Godl
The only admissible moral theory ot Creation is that the
Principle ot Good OAooot at Onae and altogether subdue the
powers of evil, either physical or moral, could not place
mankind in a world tree from the necessity of an incessant
struggle with the male:t'1etnt powers, or make them always
victorious in that struggle, but could and, did make them
ca,pable ot carrying on the fight "fii th vigour and' '\Iiri th '1'0gressively increasing success. 41
Mill believes that of all the religious exnlanations

of-the order of nature only one, the theory that God is finite,
escapes being contradictory in itself and to the facts it attempts to explain.

Mants duty, Mill suggests, consists "10

rj

38
,I:

Ibid., 58.

.39 .IJa1g.

40

~.

41

1121Q.. , .38.

The emphasis is Mill's.

13
•

st(nding forward a not ineffectue,l auxiliary to a Being of" ~er
fect beneflc~ence.ft42

In other words, Millts God needs our help.

Faith in such a God Hill considers much better adapted for nerving man to exertion "than a vague reliance on an Author of Good

who 1s supposed to be also the author of evil."

In fact, Mill

thinks that men who have been strengthened and supported by a
trust in a superintending Providenoe have really believed in a
finite God. 43 In some cases they do not state this belief openly)
in others they do not themselves realize that they so believe.

It would be tar beyond the scope of this present paper,
in someway or other, to attempt to answer the difficulties which
John Stuart Mill has seen.

However, we might indioate one pos-

sible solution to the problem he raises of sutfering'in animals.
First ot all, let us remember that the advantages and benefits
which animals, as a whole, enjoy because they are endowed with
sensation seem to surpass by tar thtlt pain that this or that ani-

mal oeeasionally feels.

AgaIn, the very nature of sensation
An

excess of

pleasurable sensation is frequently the cause of pain.

It would

~fould

seem. to neoessitate the 'Possibility of pain.

42 .ll'Wl., 39.
43

~.,

39, 40. There we find this:

"Those who have

been, strengthened in goodness by relying on the sympathizing
support of a powerful and good Governor of the v;orld, have, I am

satisfied, never really believed that Governor to be ••• omnlpotent
They have always save~ his goodness at the expense of his power.-

~--------------~
14
require a eantinual miracle on the part of God to give animals
a sense nature "h.ich, on the one hand, could enjoy pleasures, and

.on the other I could never SUrreT 'Pain in that sense nature.

Ani ...

mals have no right to such a mlratle, since, as a matter of fact,
they have no right to their very existence.
a

free gift from God.

Their existence is

Lastly, we do not know how much pain

animals surfer, but it would seem to be less than tha.t of human
beings.

Animals which lack an intellect would seem to be unable

to collect the pain that he.s passed, or to foresee the pain of
the future.

We know from our own experience that the anticipa-

tion of pain is frequently harder to bear than the actual pain
itself.

In his third essay on religion, entitled BTheism tt , Mill
rejeets several proofs for God's eXistence, finally admitting the
probability of the proof from. the design shown in the universe.
But Uill argues that design means contrivance or means to attain
an end, and this, he says, proves the finiteness of God.

At

first glanee Mill's argument is appe&ling.
It 1s not too much to say that every indication of DeSign
in the Kosmos is so much evidenoe against .the Omnipotence
ot the Designer. For what is meant by Design? Contrivance.
the adaptation of means to an end. But the necessity tor
eontrivanee--the need ot em,loying means--is a consequence
of the limitation ot ,ower. Who would have recourse to
means it to attain his end his mere word was sufficient? ••
Wisdom and contrivance are shown in oversoming diffieulties,
and there 1s not room for them in a. Being for whom no difficulties exist. The evidences, therefore, ot Natural Theology distinctly imply that the author of the KoaDlos worked

lS

•
under limitat1ons; that he was obliged to adapt himself to
conditions independent of his will, and to attain his ,nd.
by such arrangements as those conditions admitted ot. 44'

From this la:st argument and from what has gone before,
there 1s not much danger 1n mistaking Mill's position.

That he

held that God 1s finite can be stated with certainty.

It would

seem worthwhile to say something about the discussion of contri-

vance and design quoted above.

In one short paragraph we cannot

hope to solve Mill's objections completely, but perhaps we can,
at least, indicate one approach to solv1ng it.
boils down to this'

Mill's position

God i8 not omnipotent because He has to use

contrivance or design, means to attain His end.

However, we may

well inquire what 18 the end ot creation from God's viewpoint.

Is it something already attained
to be attained?

by

God, or is it something yet

If we hold that God's goodness 1s the end in

ereation, Mill's difficulty seems less ot a difficulty.

For

thus on God's part He has perfectly attained this end .inee He
a::'lways possesses entirely His own divine Goodness.

Onejthe part

of creatures, however, this end, the participation of God's
goodness, 1s yet to be attained.

On their side, then, there can

be and is eontr1tance, means to attain their end.

It we reeog-

n£aeithat all eontrivfmce 1s on the part of creatures striving

to attain their end, and that God, so to speak, has forever perFee.t Iy

I.:

44

~.,

176, 177.

16
attained His end, then we can agree to Mill's meaning of

~esign.

our eonaluslon, however, does not lead to a finite God but rather
to a God who 1s omnipotent.

This, in brief, would seem to be the

barest outline of one possible solution to the objection.
In the latter part of his essay on "Theism" Mill again
reverts to the difficulty about the evils in the world.

Again

his solution 1s that God must be finite, the Creator RIess than
Almighty.-

In making h1s Deity imperfect, M1ll escapes what

seems to him an insoluble problem, or rather, a downright contradiction.

It is the impossible problem of reconciling infinite

benevolence and justice with infinite power in the Creator of
such a world a,3Mill daily saw about him. 45

Although this 11mi te~

God of Mill's sidesteps eertain difficulties, it is not antirely
free trom inconsistencies.
some limiting agent.

The fact of limitation in God implies
In one r>la,cw4 6 Mill suggests that this

limitation 1s due either to the material with which God has to
work or to His limited knowledge and ability.

Both of these re-

plies, however, would imply that there is something more ultimate
than God.

They .thu.s raise more difficulties than they solve. We

can .ee from the following conclusions of Mill that his answer
is ·liot entirely satisfying.

, (:

45

Il.'!is1.) 186.

46

X12~g.,

174.

t
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These, then are the net results of Natural Theology on the
question of the divine attributes. A Being of great but
limited power, how or by what limited we cannot even conjecture; ot great, and perhaps ail;i;mited intelligence, but
perhaps also more narrowly limited than his power: who desires and pays some regard to the happiness of his creatures, but who seems to have other motlv'!s of aetton which
he oares more for, and who can hardly be supp~sed to h~ve
created the universe for that purpose alcne. 4
Whereas Hume might be called the first draftsman ot the
modern theory of a finite God .. and Mill, its first great developer, the American, William James, was one of its best popularizers
According to James, God in the religious life of the common run

of men 18

"8.

superhuman person who calls us to co-operate in his

purposes, and Who furthers ours if they ara 'Worthy.

He works in

an external enVironment, has limits, and has enemies_"48
James's theory of a finite God was but a logieal outcome from Mill's theory.

In tact, James dedicates his work,

PrAglitism, to Mill with the following words: "To the memory ot
John Stuart Mill from whom I first learned the pragmatic openness ot m.ind a.nd whom my fancy likes to picture as our leader
were he alive today*"49

In

A P1Yll,~stiQ

Vnivers! James states

his ?osition for a finite God in unmistakable terms, thus showJ

r

47
48
1909i~ 124.
t1~ ..

49

~.,

194.
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sible, wiped out and fOrgotten. w55

•
For James" as tor all the

other finite God theorists, the moral and phys1cal evils present
1n the world are the real stumbling block.
this in Chapter IV.

For the 'oresent, let

We will see more of
l1S

be content to see

the conclusion which James reaches in his work,

A plurali§ti,

Universe. It is in this book that much of his thought about a
finite God is contained.
The line of lee,st resistance, then, as it seems to me, both
in theology a.nd in philosophy, is to acceptt along with the
su;:>erhuman consciousness; the notion that it is not all ....
em.bracing, the notion, in other words" that there is Ii. God,
but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or
in both at once. 50
Such,1n brief, is a partial history of this theory of
a finite God in English-speaking countries.

It was suggested by

Hume, developed by Mill, and po?ularized by James.

Laurie, MeTal

gart, and Rashdall are some ot the modern philosouhers who have
carried on the theory.

Many of the same theories, problems, and

solutions that ha.ve been considered in this chapter will come
up again in a study ot another modern philosopher, Edgar Sheffield Brightman.

55

llli., 130.

56 James,' Plurl11stts Universe, 311.
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CHAPTF..R

II

PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
Edgar Sheff1eld Br1ghtman was born

Sept~mber

20, 1884,

in a Methodist parsonage in Holbrook, Massachu~,;etts ~ 1 .At Brown
University he reoeived the A.B. and A.M. degrees.

He continued

his studies at Boston University, where he received a theolog1ca
degr&e in 1910 and the doctorate in 1912,.

He was

Ii

follower ot

the absolut1sm of Royce for a While but was later converted to
James'

pragmatism~

It was wh1le at Boston Unj.versity that he

came under the 1nfluence of Borden Parker Bowne, one of the fore
most American philosophers ot his day.

Soon he turned to Bowne'

personalism although he took a more empirical approach than Bown
did.

Brightman was v&ry emi'hatic about seeking a coherent a::e ...

count ot experience.

"In h1s criticism ot other ph11osoph1es

the emphasis is on their failure to ta,ke all aspects of exoer1anae coherently into acco1rnt.

Personality 1s aff1rmed to be the

k~y to rea11ty."2
'''.:.'

"
1 Edgar S. Brightman, "Religion as Truth,," Qonje,mD9l:IJ:l:, seJ:i1rU ';theol.2sY. This art1cle gives detaIls of the autho

and h1s ear'y lite.

,

'I:
2 Walter G. Mueller and Laurence Sears, Ih!. I!@v!l$'Pmentot American Philosophy, Boston, 1940, 510.
~l

~
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Protessor Brightman has written much ahout God.

•

A mere

disconnected survey ot his books irill impress one vIi th the 1m·oor....
t8llce he places on theisnu

'fhi P;:oblem of God, The Ftnding .Q! .Q.Q.g It

Is God A Pet§on?, Religious Value., P,rson!ltty
IMoral

~,

and his most recent book, A

~

Ph!l~S9Dhy

R!lbgion,

ot Rel1gtgn.

In read1.ug these bocks one is struck by the earnestness and sincerity ot this man in his quest for truth and for a solution to

some of the problems ot lite.

His treatment ot God is always .

reverent, and his "approach to the problems of human exnerience
has always been philosophical rather than theological.-'

Reason,

then, 1s his method of approa.ch.
The practical reason 1s reason; and no amount of respect
for conscience or myst1cal experience or experimental
method or strong personalities can justity the thinker
in being satistied with what he knQws to be irrational-that 1s, contradictory or incoherent. 4

IProfessor Brightma.n sees no contra.diction between faith and
reason.

He relies on both; the two are necessary.

It fa1th is not to contradict 1tself or known tactl. it
must be reasonalbe. A faith .contrary to reason" {to use
Lockets expression) i$ a faith in the self- contradictory,
that 1s, the impossible and the unreal.'

.3

Brightman, "Religion as Truth," 53.

4 lW,., 5A·.

S Edgar S. Brightman, .An Introductj.olJ. !2Ph11osophI..
New York, 1925, )24 •
. !:

~-----------r
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ndar the guidance of reason and in the 'footstens of the great

hinkers of
God. 6

th~

ages, Professor Brightman begins his search tor

In Chapter V of his book, The Proplem

2t Goa, entitled

tfThe Resultant Idea or God .. " Professor Brightman investigates the
nature of God.

He gives a lengthy t!"finition of God and, then

elaborates on this definition.

-The Evidence for God."

The following chapter is called

Here he considers and nroposss several

arguments for the existence of God.

It is true that it is often

convenient to use some workable definition of God before actually
proving His existence.

However, to consider in detail the nature

of God and to give a tall definition of Him before considering
whether or not He actually exists, seems very muoh of a ease of
putting the cart before the horse.
or if

we

If God does not really exist,

do not know He eXists, how can we explain His nature?

Vi'hat need really 1s there to bother about the question of what
6 Whether Professor Brightman realized it or not, another philosopher centuries before him had mapped out reason as
the foundation and groundwork of his philosophy. Back tn 1264 at
Thana. wrote 1n his SB.! Contra Gentile!! "It is necessary to
have reoourse to natural reason to which all are compelled to assent. ~ ~.Q., I, 2) In another place (g.,g., I, 7) he treats snaci
fic.lly the prOblem the.t Professor Brightman he,s oonsidered above
namely, the relation between faith and. reason. It is interesting
to note that their oonelusionsare the SSl!Uh Truth is one and can
nevely,be self-contradiotory. Or as St. Thomas puts it, ItSince
therefore falsehood alone is contrary to truth, it is impossible
tor the truth of' tai th to be contra.ry to princi.1)les known by
na. t~ral reason. ft

r__----------------------------~
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God is unless we know that He is?

•
We think it more logical,
the ,

to consider first Professor Brightmants treatment of the exis-

tence of God and then the nature of Professor Brightman's God,
a:S seen from his definitions of Hlm.

We should mention in the beginning that Professor
Brightman has a criterion byl,chtch he wisheS to test all proofs
for Godts existence.

It iSI "the standard of whether they are

based on a consideration of all the facts •• 7

The author gives

six evidences which he considers proofs for God's existence. Because ot the limits of this paper we will not be able to cons1de
them in the detail in which we would like to treat them. Since
they do directly affect Brightmants concept of God Himself and

indicate the way to a finite God, we must give them some attention in this study of God's finiteness.

Our a.uthor summarizes

them thus.
Tn.a chief evidence for God, as I see it, may well be summarized under six heads. the evidence of the rationality
of the universe, the evidence ot the emergence ot novelties, the evidence of the nature of personality, the evidence of values, the evidence of religious experience.
and the evidence of systematic coherence. To some extent
these fields overlap; indeed, they must if they all tkKe
in the whole of experience from differing points of view.
I do·not present them as finalities but s1.iD1y as the
best conceptions I have been able to find •

..
7

Edgar S. Brightman, Ib! Problg

a

~.

1930j; 148.

.91 Gog, New York,
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Looking at Brightman's proofs for the existence of God,
we will see that all of them lead to his position of a finite God
The first of our author's "evidences H for God is the rationality
of

the universe.

Concerning this proof , he says: "Whatever shOll'S

the universe to be rational, shows it to be what one would exnect
from the handiwork of a supreme. mind. Jf 9

Brightman admits that

ratione.lity is a very general term and· declares that a ra.tiona.l
order in the universe does not necessarily imply such a God as
religion worships.

However, he claims that an irrational uni ...

verse would exclude the possibility of a God, that we must show
the universe to be rational if there is to be a God.

What Pro-

fessor Brightman means by rational universe is not, of course,
that the universe as a whole is eapable of reasoning.

Rather,

he means that it is a universe which gives signs of order and
that this order, in turn, must have come from a mind. lO One of
his proofs that the universe is rational is the followings
The tact of interaction among things implies a.

11.-'l'li tary
and ra.tional ground of interaction. All soience assumes
that the universe is such a system of activity that any
change anywhere implies changes elsewh!re; and these
changes occur in accordance with laws.

9 l.:Qisi., l4S.

10

~.,

150.

Thus he says, HDespite the problems

raised by Heisenberg and others o'J.r cosmos rem&l,ins an ordered

whole.

And its rational order must be everlasting. ft
11 llli, •• 149.

26

Brightman's conclusion is that the universe must be
one rational and eternal system.

•

thoug~t

of as

Thus he is led to God, but atil

"this does not yet give us a complete God, but it makes God intellectually nossible.-12 There is no indication that this God
is infinite.

In fact, -imperfections" in the order of the uni.

verse, for example, earthquakes, tornadoes ete., as we will see
la:ter, convince Professor Brightman that this God must be finite
His second proof ror God's existence 1s the emergence
of novelties.

The author explains what be means by this evidence

To say that novelties emerge is to say t~.at new properties
appear now and then in the universe which cannot be regarded as mere recombinations of what preceded them in time.
Many believe that lire has p~operti~$ so utterly different
from those at inorganic matter that no mere combitlat1on
of inorganic substances could produfje living sUbst8.£ces
unless there vrere 8. creative POWQ:t! in the universe. '
He regards it as certain that consciousness is a novelity with
properties totally different from those of unfeeling and unthinking matter.

In spite of the apparent wastefulness of life and

the vast amount of seemingly unnecessary inorganic 'matter in the
universe, Professor Brightman sees that "there is far more continuity and plan in the novelties that arise than could possibly

12

I'91d., 150.

13 l12i..s1., 151.

be accounted for by mere blind ch,f:,nee. "14

2f!
Hf:J claims tha.t faith

in a personal God is a far more intelligent a.nd less blind faith
than "faith that chance could ryroduce life and mind and

$001-

ety and genius and art and religion without any guidance by purnose."15

Th~ appeal to mere chance is an unpardonahle philoso-

phical lin.

Brightman explains why:

fect with no cause but chance."

"It assumes a rational ef-

The emergence of novelties not

only nolnts the way to a personal God. but to a finite God also.
It is also to be noted that the viev;, of a fil1ite God
in the previous chapter is far more compatible
with this combinatiqn of waste prodigality with purposive
advance than is the traditional view of an omnipotent and
benevolent oreator. 16
develop~d

The entire study of emergent novelties has led in each
of its asY)eets to God as the most reasonable eX'olanatlon
of the facts of experience, and, I may add, to Ii creative
but finite God. l ?
The third main type of evidence for God, acoording to
Professor Brightman, is that of the nature of personality.

In

his discussion of novelty this proof has been anticipated to a
certain extent, "for eonscious')ersonality is a most striking
novelty in a world ot impersonal atoms and force. h1S

14 llli", 151.
15 ~.J 153.
. ,.I:

16 l.l2.1S.. , 154

17 ..IlUA.
18

lb~g.

E01ltever,

28

•
our author judges that the unirueness of the problem of personality requires a special discussion.

He sees that "in various

ways the existence of personality makes the existence ot a personal God reasonable."

One proof of this Professor Brightman

gives as follows.

Personality is ::rganic to the universe ••• Sinc.H? mind and
things are in one constant process of interaction and interchange, it is reasonable to suppose that the whole v-·orld is
one kind, and that, the kind that we experisnce directly in
consciousness •••• Thus the fe.at of oersona11 ty points to a
world beyend our personalities, but essentially of the same
kind, that is of thought and action and ex~er1ence, yet on
a cosmic seale. To this cosmio experience ••• we give the
nlLl1e God. 19
Brightman sees another proof of God's existence in the
cause ot consciousness.

This cause of consciousness, he

says~

ftsurely carmot be a reduced and stupid seventh cousin ot consciousness} it must be a closer relative. more like a father
than aeousin. 20 In other words .. consciousness must emerge and
be produced trom a source that can really explain it.
fessor Brightman,

tis.

For Pro-

cosmic eonsc1o'usness 1s the only conceivable

source ot evolution which can be clearly seen to be adequate to
the facts. a2l

God is but another name for this 'cosmic conscious.

ness" ot which our author speaks.

19
. .I:

~.,

155, 156 •

20 lW,., 157.

21

~.

In this way, the na:'ture of

r:~#--------------------------------------~
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.

personality takes Brightman to God; but since God's personality
is "essentially of the same kind, that is, of thought and actio
and experienoe" as ours, He can hardly be said to be infinite
any more than we are infinite.
The fourth type of evidence for God is that from value.

Professor Brightman sta.tes: "In man's experience we find not
merely facts ot: sense and of self-consciousness, but we also fin
values."

22

The existence of values among men, like the existence

ot: personality, 1s a fact to be explained.

Moreover, man is not

alone 1n experiencing values.

The world ot nature behaves like human nature in this respect: it acts as though it, too, were living for some
purpose. Man strives towards ~~ds which he values, nature
strives towards ends, such as the development ot law and
ordel!", life and mind, which it seems to .iue. Thus Vie
may consider values i~~nature 1n connection with values
in human personality. '
Professor Brightman recogniZes the many t:aots in nature which
evidently show signs of purpose.

They "all point to the presenc

of a purposive power in the universe. R This purnosive
none other than God.

However, a difficulty arises.

?o~er

is

It is the

difficulty ot explaining the presD@ce of evil in the world. Evil
seems the strongest argument and. most concrete evidence against
the e~1stence of God.

f

22

As we shall see in greater detail in Chap

lla!J!.

23 .I.,b1d., ISS.
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tel' IV, this difficulty is for the present author surmountable.
Professor Brightms.n himself offers at least three weighty solutions to this problem 1n his work, ~ froRlem ~ God. 24 He
holds, too, that his theory of a finite God accounts for much of
There are simply certain things and even

the evil in the world.

over which God does not have complete power.
these things.

Evil is one of

Thus Brightman concludes that "theism gives the

most rational explanation of the facts of our value experience,
both of its evils and of its goods.,,25
Concerning the fifth main type of evidence, that from
religious experience, Brightman declare ••
It is true that a religious experienoe, taken by itself,
cannot well be used as evidence for the existenoe of the
divine ObJect toward which it is directed; but t.:ken in
connection with the rest of experience and with our total
world view, it may be regar~gd as strong empirical confirmation of belief in God.
This tifth evidence tor God is a
the other evidences.
t~t

su~plament

and confirmation ot

The author we are treating seems to imply

this proof from religious experience lea:ds to a finite God

He, does not expressly state this in Ihi Problem

~ ~

but sinc

his four previous proofs of that book brought Brightman to a
fip1~e

God, this strong "empirical confirmation" would seem to

lead to the same conclusion.
·

(:
,.

24

~.,

25

Ibid,

160.

la lh! findlng

~ ~

Brightman
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explicitly states that religious experience leads to a finite
God.
sort of God, then, is the God to whom religious
experience leads? In the nature of the case it must be
Ii finite God.
No possible experienc~7could possibly
reveal unlimited and absolute power.

Wha~t

Certainly some will disagree with the l1ne of reasoning in the
a:bove statement.

They might ask whether Professor Brightman

is not confUSing the experience with its object, God.

Does it

nec •• sarily tollow that the object of our experience, God, has

to be finite because our experience is finite?
sible to have

Ii

Is it not pos-

finite experience of an infinite God?

To say

that God. is finite because our experience of Him is fin1te,seems
like saying that the ocean contains just one quart of water
because we only have

Ii

quart-size

di~per

to measure it.

The importance our author attaches to his sixth and
last proof for God is evidenced by his following statement. BAll

ot the other types of evidence reduce to and must be 3udged
th~

by

standard of the evidence trom systematic coherence, which is

26 1.lUJ1., 161.

,Ii'

;..
27 Edgar B. Brightman,
g;t;nd W M.QQ.d, New York,
19)1," 131. The text continues. ft aod reveile"dTn ex;>ereince,
then, is powerful enough to lead the world toward higher levels,
yet it we are to believe the evidence of experience, not powerful enough to do it without great ditficulty •••• The God suggeste
.by r,lig1ous experience, then, is a spirit contending agalsnt ob
stacles."

32
the sixth and last type. w28

• in
The ultimate reason for belief

God, then, is simply because such a belief provides the best

solution to the riddle of lite and experience.

These are Bright

man f S own words ..
Renoe, the best reason for believing in God is that aoceptance of the proposition that he exists and manifests himself in the ongoing of experience leads to the most connected and eoherent view of our experience as a whole ••••
Reality is better understood as the life work of a Supreme
Person than in any other way. Every possible v.1ew leaves
us painfully aware ot the limitations at human knowledge
and of the need for further insight; but this view has the
a~dvantage2Qf pushing thought as tar as it can go toward
the light. '1
One reason why all of Professor Brightman's proofs for
the existence of God ooint the way to a finite God seems to be
thei~

lack of metaphysieal depth.

Very laudably, they sta:rt on

the emnir1cal plane, yet they neVer r1se any higher.

These proo s

of his do not seem to penetrate beneath the surface meaning ot

things and get to the heart ot their true significanoe.

Certain

ly they do not probe deep enough into the whole problem of be1ng
As_far as they go, they may be good; but that 1s prec1sely the
difficulty: they do not go tar enough.

They stay on the empiri-

cal level and cannot rise to anything higher than a finite God.

That" too, seems to be why they appea:r so uncertain.

28

Brightman, Ib&t Probl!m .2.t.2.24, 161.

29

~.,

162.

33

•
There 1s a note of hesitance that characterizes all six
of Professor Brightman t s proofs.

Such phrases

8,

s nmakes God in-

tellectually possible,n)O ncontributes to belief in God,n)l nhas
led ••• to God as the most reasonable explanation,n)2 and "makes the
existence ot

11

personal'God reasonable,

.l'

to betray

flEH,Un

of conviction in the certainty of the proofs offered.

a

lack

Evidently

Professor Brightman thought that probability as to God's existenee
was all that was possible.
~igion,

In a later book, P!lfton p.llty J,l.l£

114-

published in 1934, Brightman acknowledges that his evidence

for God gives only probabillty«
From a strictly logical standpoint, therefore, knowledge
about the real world a~nd God is not absolute, but merely
probable. It is useless to pretend that scienee or philosophy can bring absolute proof--muoh Ie.. disproof--of God.
But with all the limitations ot his reason, man can see
that faith in til personal God has a degree of probability
which exceeds that of rival theories. J 4
Turning now trom a consideration of Professor Bright.
man's proofs for God's existence and how they led him to a finite
God, we oan take
by

til

brief look at several definitions of God given

our author in his various w·orks.

j:
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book, lh!. froblem 2! God,!

•
It is the most com:Jlete defini.tion

y;hich we will find in any of Brightman t s works, E:.nd a,l though 1t
is lengthy, it is worth Quoting in its entirety.
·Qod is a oonscious neTson of perfect good will. He 1s
the source of all value and so 1s worthy of worship and
devotion. He 1s the creator of all oth.r persons and gives
them the power of free choice. Therefore his purpose oontrols the outcome of the universe. Rispur1)ose.l.nd his
nature must be inferred from the way in whioh exnerience
reveals them, namely, as being gradually attained through
effort .. difflculty, and suffering. Hence there is in Godts
very na.ture something which makes the effort and pain ot'
life necessary. There is within him, in addition to his
reason and his active will, a passive element whieh enters
into every' one of his conscious states, as sensation, instinct, and imuulse enter into ours, and constitutes a
problem tor him. This element we call The Given. The evils
ot lite and the delays in the attainment of value, in so
tar as they come from God and not from hum.an freedom, a.re
thus due to his nature, yet not wholly due to his deliberate
choice. His \'rill and reason acting en The Given produce the
world and achieve value in it.,5
Although Professor Brightman calls the above paragraph a "definition", it is obvious that he does not mean a definition in the
striot sense of the word.

It is rather a descriptive definition

or a description.
For a personalist such as Brightman, one of the most
imoortant ideas in the above description ot God is that He is a
?erson.

Personality is the key note ot personalism.

good p'assage in Professor Brightman's

l!.

Goa A

We find a

{!e.u2nl which in-

dicateS his stand on the meaning of personallty.,6
, J:

The eternal
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reality in the universe for the ?ersone11sts 1s

persona11~y.

Wha t we call matter and energy tL'1d their laws are simply the
functioning of a cosmic personality.

The relation bet.leen matter

and spirit, then, is really a relation between

sn1~1t

and spirit.

Brightman admits that this persone,11st view of the universe 1s
"& hypothesis to be tested in relation to the rest of our ex-

perience and thinking.·,7

What does our·author mean when he says

that God is a consoious Person?

He himself remarks. IITooa,11

God personal is to hold that the

~metions

of conscious Dersona1

ity are present in him to the highest possible degree.

,8

functions are feeltng, thought, ~nd wil1. U

These

This t:ype of per-

sonalism which Professor Brightman holds seems, at times, to eom
very close to pantheism'
The important thing is the agreement of ~ersonalists on the
belief that the processes of the universe are all forms ot
.conscious purpose; that evolution 1s the striVing of God
himselt; and that every material thing as well as every
person has some place in that purpose.';9
The note of God's perfect good will seems also to be
essential to BrIghtman theory of God as seen in the lengthy description of God given on the previous page,

1932, 12.
.Ji
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•
tha.t God 1s the creator, Md he maintains that man receivesf'ree

will as a gift frmlJ. God.
~md

His nature.

Brightman elso mentions God f $I purpose

He states that these "must be inferred froIll the

way in which experience reveals them, namely, as being gradually
attained through effort, difficulty, Emd suffering, ,,40

Here y,;e

must say again that there is danger in confusing "the way in
'lfJhich experience revee.ls" God IS nature and
ture v.nd pur?ose of God in themselves.

pur~)ose

with the na-

The.!l.i..I of' "xller1ence

with us finite creatures is always going to be finite.
fore, we confuse the
God in

~

of our knowing God with the

Himself, we cannot helt) reaching

have .01'& to say about the

pur~ose

El

It,there

n~ture

fini t·e God.

of

We will

of God in a later chapter.

Without stoPPing to consider it in detall, we should also mention the peculiar el.ement of lhi Given in Brightman's descriptio
of God.

Th!i 1U.ven,

'IA'e

must remember is a passive element con-

tained in Godta very nature.

We will have ,to turn to this inter

nal element in God in Chapter V to understand Professor Bright
when he otters his explanation ot evil.
Brightman sums up the descriptive definition of God
which we have been considering in the following terms.
'God is

8.

person -supremely conscious, supremely valuable,

and supremely creative, yet limited by the free choices

,1.\

40 Brightman, Ib! ?robJ.em !!.t..Q2sL 113.
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of othet persons and by the restrictions 11'i thin his Olli'1l
nature. 41

For Brightman, then, God is definitely lim1t9c, a finite God.

Three important notes ot his theory of God are: (1) that God is
a. person--and tor Brightman consciousness 1s an imlJortant P81"t42

of personalIty; (2) that He is the creator) (3) that He is supremely good or valuable.
In a later work, Protessor BrIghtman explicitly includes some qualities 1n God v,rhich he had not previously mentioned.

Thus in Per!onality

~ n§l~gl2n

our author says;

God is an eternal conscious personal spirit, infinite in
duration. selt-existent, 11mited only by the eternal reason
and content of his own personality and, ot course, by lJ
such conditions as he voluntarily imposes unon himself.~
Here we see that Brightman mentions the fact that God is a spirit
a:s well as a person.

Since He is infinite in duration, He has

existed from 8,11 eternity.

We will see later, however, that

according to Professor Brightman, God is affected by time even
though He 1s eternal..
its a:ppearance.

Here,too, the note of self-existence makes

As we go on, we shall see thllt 1s a note which

1s extremely important.

In the present definition, Brightman

sees God as limited by the eternal reason and content of his own
personality.

·1:

41

This 1s the same astht Given mentioned already.

~.,

'f,

113.

Y 1..: 1 .42. Cf. Edgar S. Brightman, !. PhtlQsophx Ii.!.. lde§lrl, New
or.a.'I 928,
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God i$ also limited by "the conditions he voluntarily imposes an
11imself.- ·This last limitation of God would include "the free
choices of other nereons· which Brightman considered a limitation
of God in one of the foregoing definitions.

Thus, in /?ermon§11tx

Ang Religion Brightman augments but does not contradict or deny
what he held in his previous work.
In his latest work, A Ph1loso'ghlof

R~11gion,

Professor

Brightman stresses exceptionally strongly the note tbat God's
will 1s tinite. "Striotly we should speak of a God whose will is
finite rather than a f1.'llte God. 1t44

In 8nothero'8.ssage in this

same work, Brightman gives this note of Godts finite will as the
distinguishing marl( between theistic finitism and theistic

~b-

solutislIU
The two forms of theism agree in the propOSition that God
1san eternal, conscious s?irit, whose will is unfailingly
good. The difference between the two may best be brought
out by saying that theistic absolutism is the view that the
will of God r8~es no conditions within the divine experience
which that will did not create (or at least approve)t wherea::, theistic f1nitlsm is the opposing view, namely) that
the will of God does faee conditions within the di?ine experience which that will neither created nor approves. 4,
ThiS, it Vlould seem" 1s an excellent su.m.mary of the two positionlH

43 Brightman,

P~Is2na*~ty ~ ~~1~gl2n,

44 Br1ghtman, A Phl:J.o~crRh;{ .Q.!
):

.45

lW.-, 281,

282.

a(~l!iii.on,

97.
337.

39
Perhaps it

Ei.bove

v~")uld

~untt",tion

l".['ve "teen better, hc'!)':ever, h,:.d Erightmf:.n in the
substituted the phrase "or at Iee.st pemi t" in.

nIece of "or at Ieest approve."
]erm,1 t§ sins.

'f'e can

r:~(Y'ter

lieee.use of men f s free ...will, God

say God P!H?l'oves sin.

According to

Professor Brightman) theistic [,bsolut1sm tends to overemphasize
the perfections cf God and of cref'bu'es; theistic fini tism, on

the other hand, raise! qu.estions about the perfections of the
creator. 46
Professor Brightman's proo.fs for the existence ot God
seem naturally to lead him to a. fin! te God.
of God, he crms1stently defines God
though he may emuhesize tr,is or

t~t

&8

~.

In his der.ini tions

fin! te Person.

Al-

cheracterist!e in di,fferent

definitions, there is one note to be found in 811 of them, name-

ly, that there ls limitation within the very nature of God.

Finally, in his latest book, Brightman locates that limitation
in God as coming from His finite 1Ftll.

more about this finite God theory of

OU.!,

To understand a little
author,

~re

shall con-

sider in our next chapter his thought on some of the attributes
of God.

•

CHAPTER III
THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD
We learn the nature of a particuls.r being from that
being's actions and operations.

The sa.me is true of God; from a.

study of His work in the universe a.round us we learn something
about God Himself.

From the effeets of God's actions we know

the actions themselves; and knowing them, we attribute certain
qualities to His nature.

An attribute, we know, is a quality

that 1s due to something.
this particular thing.

It is characteristic of the nature or

The attributes of God, then, are those

qualities or marks -which are to be ascribed to God, precisely as
God.

It is of the very nature of God that He be thus and not
Now the attributes ascribed to God will differ ac ....

otherwise~.

cording to this or that theory about God.

In this chapter, five

attributes which are important in Brightman's theory ot God will
be_C'onsidered; for these attributes 131ainly show that the natu.re
of-his God is finite.

The first attribute to be investigated is

the perfection of God. l
Professor Brightman declares: "God, then.. is by def1ni

.j:

1

BrightLl'Uln,

Personal:!, ty !And Re11g;ion, 76.
40
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tion the ens RerfecyissiW1&Q, the most perfect being. ff2

He

con-

sults the etymology of the viord "perfect" and finds that perfecJiio means "con:wletion. ,,3

Something perfect, then, would be some

thing finished or completed.

Certa.inly nott

completed?

But is it possible for God to be

Thus our author concludes th&t God

is not perfect but rather infinitel:! perfectible.
There is no perfected person whose being is completed and
whose perfection 1s finished! but there may be a person
w'bose will is unfailingly good end whose task is eternal
and inexhaustible. Such a person would 'be divine; his perfection W'ould not be elf 5.nfini te completeness but an infinite perfectibility.4
In A ?hl1gsophy

.2! Bmligion Professor

Brightman

SllInS

teaching of his earlier works on this ?oint, saying:

ever, we S11bstitute for

~ertection

up the tote.
~en#

how-

the ideal of the inexhaustibl

perfectibility, we have a ooncept 8lJ1)licable to both God and men

and adequate to man's religious needs.~5
It is true that perfection does have the etymnlog1.cal

meaning of ·oompletion ff or totaliter

rac~Ym'

To

s~y

that this i

the meaning of the word when a.-pp11ed to God, hOTl/ever, is to misunderstand word usage.
by h,nd, but
!

~'ho

EtymologicEllly, m!:l111;ta¢;k"1.1re means to mak

would say that is the common mean:tng of the

f

t:

2

.Ih;tg.

:1

Ibid., 78.

4 l.1!lA., 79
5 Brightman,

A Phil~!opbI

Qt

R!l!g~og,

.340.

VlO
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today?

•
Today it has more the mea.ning of making by m.achinery.

?erfection, according to standard dictionaries, can mean nsuprem
;;;xce11ence· or "'the cond! tion,. sts,te, or quall ty of being perfect or free from e.l1 defect. n v;,bile perfect ce,n

mac,n

"in the

state of complete excellence; fref? from any flaw or im:)erfection

of ql:1B.litjr,. or age,in, "hnv:lng all the ess€mti£.l elements, quall
ties or characteristlcs."6

Taken in this sense, "perfection" os

be applied to God without im?lying any perfectibility or change
in Him.

It 1s not perhaps e..n absolutely suitable word to des-

cribe the Deity, but then what human word is?

An error much more serious than that of confusing the
etymology of e word with its true meaning is Professor Brightman s
confusion of perfection and perfectibility.

"The divine perfec-

tion, then," Brightman holda, If!., an Infini te series of ;:)erfact...

ings.?erfect1on means perfectibility.a 7
Really, Professor BTlghtman understan1s that perfee-

tion can be c'ms1dered in two radically different ways:
'1'hare is the im:lersonal

'.

p'3rf~cti()n

of a. circle that is

James Augustus Henry ~ful'"ray, (~d.) A New ~~li~~
.QJl Hi§torig§l P;r::wgiple;, Oxford, 1928, VII, 82-S4.

6

ntlt10nary

7

Brightman,

~

Problem

sr ~,

lS3.

43
•

perfectly circular, or of a mountain, the proportions of
which are perfectly satisfying. There is also the personal
perfection of a blameless character and a thoroughly adequate intelligence engaged in the inexhaustible creation
of ne'?! forms of spiritua,l life. S
Impersonalperfeetion is "icIly regular, snlendidly null."

In

it "there 1s no life, no change, but magnificient dee,th."

Per-

sonal perfection, also, has changeless, eternal, perfect laws to
which the good will always conforms.

type of changelessness, there is the
tibility.9

But in addition to this
essentia~l

note of perfec-

We can agree with Professor Brightman that 'oerfection

of human beings on this earth does involve a not.e of perfectibility.

We learn this from our every day contaet with persons.

No one is so perfect that he cannot improve.

But can this fact

of perfectibility, taken as it is from experience with human per-

sons, directly be applied to God? .
Perfectibility
a perfection.

im~lies

the potential power to receive

For example, if there were potentiality in God,

He would have to receive a perfection trom some other being than
Himself.

Consequently, that being would be more perfect, more

ultimate than God.

If this second being Were perfect in the

sensfi! of perfectible, it too would have to receive any new perfectldn from a third being, and so on, to an infinite series.

. j'

S

Brightman,

9

~.

lll!

Ftnd~ni

9I. Q29., 1.30, 1.31.
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infinite series, however, does not give a rational reason for the
existence of any existing perfectible being nor of the whole
series.

This whole question is, perhaps, best seen from the ex-

ample of contingent beings.
We see around us thousemds of contingent
that are capable of existing or not.

be1r~gs,

thing!

.At one tim.e they dtd not

exist; then they came into being; and, perhaps, in a short while
they will ceB.s;e to exist.

The ultimate answer

1'01'

tence eannot be from other contingent peillgs, for

their existh~YI

too, hav,

to look outside themselves for the reftson of tbe1r existence.
Nor is an infinite series of contingent beings an answer.

This

fails to answer the question of how the infinite series came int
being.

No, the answer must rest in a being that must neces.ar11'

exist, a being who 1s existence.

This be1ng we call God.

And

this God is Pure Act .. that is, the Principle of being, smpremely
a:ctlal, capable of

reee1vL~g

nothing from any other beulg eim·

ply because He contains in His very nature the actualization of
existence and all p'arfect1ons

conn~cted

i l no room for imperfection in Him..

t'.f1 ~h existence..

Ther~

He has no :;)Otency to be ac ...

tuated; hence, God, the Ultimata, 1s all 'Osrfect.

Professor

Brightman contradicts himself 'when he makes his God u.ltimate and
yet perfectible; his theory of a
out' ,tir this contradiction.

fin1t~

God is an

~~ttenr,)t

to get

~-'--------------------------~
to wonder whether Professor Brightman hold,s that God
He states the argument for this position well.

..u. •infinite

Then we come to

a passage which looks very much like a pars,dox: "The truth and

value of divine infinity can hardly be Guestioned, and is not
questioned e!en by those who call God finite, when the finitenes
supposed is wi thin God and not imposed by anything externs.l to
This, we shall see nres~tly, is really the position ot

him. ft12

He holds that God is finite-infinite, that is, fi-

Brightman.
ni~e

in some respects and infinite in others.
This doctrine is expressed in

Personll~~Y ~

in the chapter, "The Finite .... Infinite God."

R!lig;on

However, the author

had pro"Oosed the idea of a finite God in a "Jrevious work, lb.!
Probkem

2[~.

There he introduced his idea of The Given as

an internal limitation in God:
The Given must be within the divine consciousness and not
external to it; for otherwise it does not explain why God
has so much genuine difficulty in expressing his ideai~pur
poses, combined with so much control and achievement. ~
In.lh!

11nd~ng

Q! QQd Brightman repeats this idea that God is

tinite, "limited by an uncreated 'Given' in his eternal nature

as well as
Br~g~tman

by his will.,,14

But experiences teaches Professor

that the divine will can solve every problem and bring

12

~.,

13

Brightman, The Problem £!~, 182, 183.
Brightnisn,Thi l1nd ing S1l. Gog, 13.

14

75.
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~alue out of every situation, no matter how evil it may be. 15

ThuS Brightman calls God the Controller of TllS given. 16
In his latest work,

A Philosophy ~

Relig~on,

our autho

reiterates that In! Giyen is "first, eternal within the experience of God and hence had no other origin than God's eternal being; and secondly, that it is not a nroduct of will or created
activity.n l7 For Brightman, then, God's finiteness does not me
that He began nor that He will end nor that He is limited by any
thing outside Himself.

"Strictly we should speak of a God whose

will is finite rather than a finite God) for even the finite God
is absolute in the sense of being the ultimate source of all ar
ation. n18 Our author gives a good summ~ry of his pOSition on a
"finite-infinite God in

A Philolonhy ~

Religion:

God's will, then, is in a definite sense finite. But We
have called him "finite-infinite." Although the power of
his will is limited by The Given, arguments for the objectivity of ideals give grounds for the postulate that his
will for goodness and love 1s unlimitedl likewise, he is
infinite in time and space, by his unbegun and unending
duration and by his inolusion of all nature within his esperienee; such a God must be unlimited in his knowledge of
all tha.t is, although human freedom a.nd the nature of The

):

15

~.,

16

Brightman, A Pbilosooh"l .QL Religion, .336.

17

~.,

18

~.

13.

337.

Given probably limit his knowledge of the precise
of the tuture. 19

d~ail

How did Professor Brightman arrive at this position of
a "finite-infinite'" God, and why does he maintain it?

The 1'01... "

lowing passage will, J1'believe, sta.rt us tOVl,rard a. partialanswert

A real infinite must be definite, although the word means

"boundless," a. real infinite must have bounds. To say that
the real God is infinite, then, means that he is the se1texistent source of all being; but it does also mean that
he contains and recognizes limitations. If he didn't he w
would be formless, meaningless, lawless28haos--a Greek infinite instead of a religious infinite.

In the first book of The MetauWiig"

Aristotle nar ...

rates that most of the earliest philosophers regarded prinCiples

of a material kind as the only principles of all thinls.

Thus

Thales held that the first principles of everything was water;
Heraclitus ot Ephesus, fire; Anaximenes believed it was

ai~J

and

Empedoc1es said it was a combination of the above three plus
earth. 21
Some of the early Greeks seem to identity the infinite
with something material.

Because the infinite is in the cate-

gory of quantity, Aristotle says'that substance or quality or af

19

Ib~g.,

.3.37.

20 Brightman, Pet,onalitx
21

cr.

~

R'bigioS, 75, 76.

Aristotle, letluhI§iQ!, I, "

9S3b, 984&
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Professor Brightman cites Plato

tection cannot be infinite. 22
~lebul,

27D) in warning against a blind devotion to the word,

'infinite,- and especially against usupposing that there is any
intellectual or religious value in the idea of an utterly unlimited infinite. w2 )
The Greeks, then, whether or not they believed that
the infinite was this or that matarisl principle or, on the othe
had, denied that the infinite was to be identified with

mE~otter,

did agree on this, namely, that the infinIte was indeterminate.

As such it had infinite Dotentialities and was, therefore, imp
teet.

Because the infinite was undetermined, it was also unin-

telligible.

Professor Brightman seems to confuse the infinity

which the Greeks thought of as a formless chaos with the formal
infinity that is one of the attributes of God.

,

That is the rea-

Ion why Brightman says that God ha.s to contain limitations.
Othen;ise, " ••• if he didn't [contain limitation~ he [God] would
be formless, meaningless, lawless chaos.w 24
rea~ize

It is only if we

that Brightman has in the back of his head the idea of

Greek undetermined infinity that the foregoing words have meaning.

-

That is why he says: w, real infinite must be definite ••••

22

Aristotle, Phy,+q"

III, 6, 2078..

23

Brightman, Personakity and Be11gion, 75.

24

Ibid., 76.
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a real inrini te must have bounds •• 25

It '\ivas partially to pro....

teet God from being considered a ·meaningless chaos· that Professor Brightman proposed his theory of a "finite .... infinite" God.
His theory, he believes, is a rational interpretation of the empirical facts. 26
Brightman admits that God is the hself-existent source
of all being •• 27 If, however, God is selt-existent, unbegun,
and

unending, He is the necessary being that we have seen from

a consideration of contingent being.

We saw that there had to

exist a being which contained in its very nature the reason of
its ovmexistence.
nature to exist.

This being we call God.

It is Godls very

He is neither from determining matter, nor is

He matter determined by torm.

If God, then, is self-sufficient,

He 1s Pure Act unbounded by any potency, any restrIction, any
limitation.

Conseq:uently, He is infinite.

It is simply be-

cause the divine act of being is not received in anything, in
other words because God is his own self-subsistent act ot being,
that He is both infinite and uerfect.

Definiteness imDlying fi-

niteness, then, is the second attribute which is characteristic

25

~.,

75.

26 J:.:Q14., 97.
27 lll1!!., 75.
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of Brightman t s theory of God.
Two other points which are contained in Brightman f s
thinking about God md which clearly indicate that God is finite
are change and time. From what we have already seen of Brightman's notion of the oerfectibil1ty of God, it is evident that
he believed God could really change; for without change God could
not grow in perfection.

Change and time are closely allied.

Our

author treats them as twin sisters, and we shall attempt to follow him in this.
In a chapter on "The Patience ot God. in his book, ThJ
lindWI 9l..Q.2si, Professor Brightman inYestigates 'whether the
time in which this patience ot God is revealed is a revelation
of the very nature of God himself, or whether God, the Eternal,
is elevated above all time. ,,28

In spite of the fact that there

is much philosophioal thought that points toward God as an utterly timeless being, Profess::'or Brightman thinks that an utterly

timeless eternity
diseuse verbally

i~

th~

'much .asier to adore unthinkingly or to
to comprehend intelligently.-

In the fol-

lowinc pas,age he tells what he means by the word -timeless·,
be timeless mems to lack all of the attributes of time,
to have no before or after, no change, no activity, no
pa.st, no present, no future. Offhand it would seem that

~o

28 BrightmCn, In! linSkng

~~,

125.
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an utterly timeless being could not possibly stand in any
causal or significant relation to the Ylorld of time. Any
being that causes temporal changes would itself ht~e to
change or act in order to initiate those changes.
Brightman admits that there is a type of timeless objeot which we tind in our temporal experience.
ample ot the conception of a triangle.
ff

He gives the ex-

However, he sees that

a timeless mathematical triangle has no cause and oan have no

effects •••• is eternal and power1ess. ft '0

God cannot be timeless

as mathematical principles, or universals, or the laws of logic
are timeless.
A god, to have value either as a metaphysical explanation
or our real experience in time or as an ob3e~t of religious

worship, must it is true, have a character which is the
same at all times and which neither begins nor ends, but he
must also stand in active, dynamic relations to the changing
world of experience. Unless there is activity and time
within him, he stands in an utterly unintelligible relation
to a world ot activity and time. How could an utterly
changel~ss being generate change"l
Not only is an absolutely timeless eternity inconceivable
but if it could be conceived, it would fa,!l to explain the
time-order and the part that is played by time in every
eXperienoe and every tact of the Teal world. It would render the who 1'2 oosmi'c evolutionary process super.fluous and
meaningless.;;J,
Profeslor Brightman considers in some detail the rea29 l.Ri.S.. , 126.
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,ons for time in God.

Whether God is an omnipotent Creator or

• fInite Creator, -in either case, we must think of him as act
in time; in either ease, creation actually occurs only when the
creature begins to be.-'l

Our author points out that this is

true whether we believe that the world is an eternal creation or
a

creation

a~t

SOMe

definite tIme, -for in both cases, one or

infInitely many acts of creation are performed in time, and in
bOth, the time process has to be continually conserved and sus-

talned.· 34 Revelation also points to time in GodC

"This is es-

pecially true it the coming ot Christ had any signitlcence tor
God.,,3S

.r.

The God ot history is a God for whom historical changes

real, a God 'who somehow brings his will to expression in

human life through them••36 Lastly, religious experience definitely paints to a theory ot God which admits time and change in

God, so Protessor Brightman belie".es:
A real change occurs when man turns from selt to God, tram
human sin to divine righteousness. That change, it religiou. faith be at all warranted, is not merely a change in
man's attitude, but also a change in God. God eould not
rightly treat the repentant and the unrepentant, the indifferent and loyal, the hostile and the loving,a~l in the
lame way••• Hence, things happen in God's experience. time
1s real tor him, he looks ahead with patience to what his
children have not yet beeo~e.'7

-

33

Ib,S&., 128.

34

XbJ,d.

35

lW., "129 ..
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Our author sees one serious objection to this tempors11st1c view of God, namely, that it necessarily detracts from
the divine perfection.

But with his understanding that perfec-

tion means perfectibilIty, as we explained above, Brightman can
without contradiction hold that

tL~e

is essential to God.

For Brightman, however, this view of time as a real
•• sential aspect of God does not deny his concrete eternity.
denies only his abstract timelessness and it alone makes his
.terni"ty even approximately intelligible.')S

The divine eternity means God's endless duration (duree
reelle) ••• There must be something eternal! tor timeless
nothingness could not have produced a wor d. The ditficult!es with endless duration, then, are difficulties of
our imagination which inhere in any ~ossible view of reality.39
Professor Brightman's temporal1st1c view

ftrecogni~es

that God

transcends time by his eternally perfect goodness and his e
knowledge of all that 1s knowable (it it is worth knowing).n40
According to Brightman's theory, this knowledge would have to

elude the future choices of free persons.

To sum up, his

~osi

tlon 1s that God is etarnal in duration, goodness, and knowledge

but that -time is essential to the very nature
37

.l.9.1s1. , 129, 130.

38 niS.., 131.
.39 Ibid., 131, 1.32.
40 Ib1&1., 1)2.

-

or

God and is a

L

5;
condition o~the divine perfect1on. ft4l
"~oral

Belief in such a God ls

necessity tor freedom; a religious necessity .for redem-p-

tion. a metaphysical neoessity for creation; and an ideal
sity, it God's perfection be perfectibi11ty.ft42 ,

nee.s~

Without delaying longer on this question ot change and
time, WG may say that Protessor'Brightmants position springs fro
the notion that to etfect something 1n time the CE.use must be
a:ctually in time.

This is certainly

which work by motion.

of contingent caus@s

The element of time 1s essential to their

However, time does not seem to be essen.tial for acre

activity.

at!ve cause.
creator.

t~le

Here the effect oceurs simply

~r

the willing of th

This will act can be from all eternity.

if God is changeless.

It has to be,

The terminus or object of that volition

does not have to exist actually trom all eternity as a separate
being, but only at such a point when God wills that it should
here and now a:etually begin to exist.

This 1s possible because

the world tollows not trom the nature ot God, but from the tree
will of God

acoording to the determinations, including tho •• ot

time and place, decreed

by

God through His intellect and will.

The object of God t , volition 1s eternal in the sense that God

sees this particular being trom all eternity and wills that it
should exist.

\
;6
4

We have seen that it was the selt-existence ot God
which led to our oonviction ot His infinity.

This self.existenc

Professor Brightman readily admits.43

this common ground

Taking

of Godts selt-existence, let us see 1f Godts immutability cannot
Selt-existence, as we have already seen in

be demonstrated.

this present chapter, is the prerogs:tive of a being whose exis ....
tence is not contingent but necessary.
in a state ot complete actuality.

This neeessary being is

We eall this being God, the

Pure Act in whom therei! no potency whatever.

Having no potane

then, God is incapable ot any change; tor a change is the actual
izing of some potency.

If God 1s selt-existent, He must be un-

changeable.
From the immutabilIty ot God it 1s only a halt-ste1' to
his eternity.
cess!pn or

Whatever is unchangeable, and thus, without suc-

ehange~

without beginning or end, cannot be measured

by time J for time is the measurement of -betore- and latter" in
movement.

Beca~se

God is immutable, and because time has to do

with cha.ngeable beings, time Q!Nl2:k be "essential to the very
nature of God.,
ni ty.

. ,I.:

The measurement ot God's duration is called ete

Boeth1us defines etern! ty as .ntem.nabil;t§ vitae !9Ja.

42

~.,

43

Cf.. Brightman, P,ff 0 !l111 t:y; and Rf,l;tg;ton, 75, 76.
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investigation 1nto the apparent limitation of Godts power-.
First of all, let us investigate what the meaning of
the word g;p1notence 1s. Does it mean the power to do anything

and everything?

Or rather, does it mean the power to do every-

th1ng that 1s absolutely possible, in other words, everything

that does not
Tll!....Pl:2bl.em

co~a1n

ot ~

& note of self-contradiction'

In his book

Professor Brightman seems to indicate thet,

for him, omnipotence means the power to do anything at all, .
Tradl tionally God. has been thought of as self·caused (.sa]'UH!
.lYl.) and as pure actuality (a.ctU& RUrYI)--a being completel~
leIr-determln-t~d w1.th no potentl:i'rl ty for f1.l.rther development ••• lf God be regarded as a wholly self-caused will, ~e
are·brought into serious difficulties. Can God choose
whether his nature shall be in time or not? The old ouestions haunt us, Can he make a round. triangle, a two which
multiplied by two will produce s1x, a time prior to his
aVrIl existence? Manifestly not ••• His nature as a conJcious
being sets limits to his will; God must be t1nlte. 47

It is important to note that the conclusion, -God must be finite-, follows because there seems to be a limitation of God's
power.
In lb.!. FillSU·ng 91. .Qgg, our author seems to hedge somewhat on what he has said in !hI Proplem

~~.

He seems to re-

treat to at sort or middle way by denying that there 1s a real
concept of omnipotencel .The concept of omnipotence as a power

to do everything is absurd) but when it is conceived as a power

'J,:

r'
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to do everything possible-- to Ido the doable,' as Bowne,said-it is a limited 61~ipotence."48

It is better, Brightman says,

not to claim the power to do everything when some things s,re ad ....
mittedly impossible.
A person is said to be omnipotent, however, it he is
able to do everythIng that is possible, absolutely speaking.
Now a thing is slid to be possible if the predIcate can be joine
to the subject in a proposition. A thing !I ?osslble if there is
no contradiction in its intrinsic notes.

We see an example of

a true possible in the proposition: The man is tall.

There is

nothing about tallness which is contradictory to the idea ot
manhood.

The predicate can be correctly joined to the subject.

On the other hand, an example ot something imnoss1ble would bel
"

The man is a horse.

There are contradictory notes in the actual

beIng; the predicate cannot be joined correctly to the subject)
so this second proposition is not possible.49
The only thing opposed to the notion of being is nonbe1ng.

A non-being is likewise unable to fulfill the definition

ot a ,possible since at the same time it includes the idea ot'a.1niand .w:m.-l1IW. Such a "thing" <toes not come under the scope
of divine omnipotence, therefore .. because it is not "doable".

,,I:
48 Brightman, lb!

'0

l1n~lng

ct. i. %., I, 25, 3.

g! God, 180.
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It is selt-contradictory.

.

It is more correct, then, to say that
such a thing cannot be done than to say that God cannot do it. 50
Thus the proot tor Godts omnipotence
the selt-existence of the divine being.

a~gain

stems from

The foundation of di-

vine power is the divine nature which, because of its self-existanee, is infinite.

Subsistent being, however, is not restrict-

ed to any particular type of

perfection of all being.

b~ingJ

it has within itself the

Thus whate.er can have the true nature

of being is contained under the

~~ssibles.

And in respect to

these, God Is said to be omnipotent.
With this understanding of omnipotence, which seems to
be the most satisfying, and with the realization that this attribute flows from· the self-existence of God, we can now trace
briefly the steps which led Professor Erightman to his oonviction that God is limited in power.

The first step has already

been given. Brightman's misunderstanding of the meaning of omnipotence.

Secondly, our author stresses the pOint that his idea

of God best coincides with the facts of experience.'l Looking at
natu'e, Brightman conclude. it is the work of a power, but that
this power is working under great difficulties 52

i51

52

Brightman. Thf! Pr9l:il.~ug g! 80d, 125.
Brightman The llnd tnJ At~, 117.
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In the third place, Brightman speaks more explicitly

in referring to the evils in the nhys1cal world around us, 8the
presence of earthquakes, cyclones, and disease germl in the worl
He argues that if all that we regard as hindering good is, from
God's standpoint, tor the best, then our knowledge ot good and
evil is so imperfect that we cannot
anout what is mean by either good or

s~rely

pass judgement at all

evil~

He sees a more seri-

ous and more tar reaching danger in this further problem.
If our hy?othesis requires us to regard every natural disas
ter, every disease, mental or phYSical, every item of apparent waste or futility in evolution, every dinosaur and
imbecile, as really a perfect means to the perfect end,
ought we not in tairness to the limitations of our experience and knowledge rather to avow agnosticism than theism'S
Professor Brightman admits that human sin 1s a sufficient answer tor some evils.

But he sees "that the universe eon

tains ob.taoles to the will ot God besides the obstacles due to
Since these obstacles delay the ful1"illment ot good
ness and beauty, they cannot be due to the will of God. S4 Inhuman sin.'

timately bound up with this whole problem 01" the evil forces existing in the world is the
powe~.

sel.e~

. j:

two~fold

problem ot God's love and Hi

Brightman's stand cannot be mistakenl "It we ask our...
why a loving God lets such forces loose in his world, we

53

Brightman, Pusonll! tz And Re11,t9U, 96.

"

54 Brightman,

lbl ltnd 1ng £t

God,ll!.
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have no answer as long as we hold to d1vine omnipotence. n55

His

conclusion 1s that the concept of God's love or that of His powe
must be revised;

it 1s the latter which Professor Brightman

chooses to amendl "On our view, God is perfect in w1ll, but not
in achievement; perfect in power to derive good trom all situ...
ations, but not in power to determine in detail what those situations will be. n56
Professor Brightman's theory of the attributes of God
does point to his theory of a finite God.

Thus his conclusions

picture God as perfectible, finite-infinite, changeable,
eternal yet affected by time, and lastly, limited in power.

To

understand more tully the nature of God according to Professor
Br1ghtm.an and the limitation of God's power, it seems best to
consider next the problem of evil.

It is principally this prob-

lem that has led our author to his belief 1n God's lim1ted power
It 1s this problem that is at the heart or his theistic f1nitism.

55

~.,

153.

56 Brightman, lbi

Prob~1m

st ~, 1)7, 138.
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CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF GOOD-AND-EVIL
Belief in God raises sevtral difticulties.

One ot the

most perplexing problems for Professor Brightman 1s the problem
ot good-and-evil.

He maintains that it is a two-told problem,

Dnot the problem ot good or the problem of ev!l, but the compoun
problem ot go-od-and-erll ••l

this problem 1s Brightman's chief

reason for holding that God is tin.it..

It a satisfactory answer

can be given to this weighty and difficult question, Brightman's
theory of theistio t1nitism will have to be revised.

He det.r-

mined, as we saw in Chapter III, that the only reasonai}le solu....
tion to this problem at good-and-evil was the oonclusion that
God's nature was limited.

In this chapter, another solution

will be attempted, a solution which will not sacrifice the omnipotence and the dignity ot God.
on _this' matter,

we

In treating Protessor Brightman

will quote rather frequently from his latest

book, .A. Philosophy' of Relig1on.

This will assure us of being

fair .1n giving our author's own words and his latest position

andcQnclusions.
:

.;
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As we read through the works of Professor Brightman,
We

become aware that there is a common note underlying much of his
thinking on this problem of good-aDd-evil.

It is the note of

optimism, the doctrine that everything should be absolutely the
best.

In The Finding of God we find him saying that God's ways

are strange and not such a:s we would prefer if we were doing th
"If God is the omnipotent being he is tra.d1 tionally

choosing.

believed to be, it is very strange that he has chosen the slow
and cos;tly means of evolution for the creation of 11£e.,2

If

God is conceived as limited within His nature, Brightman says

"But it is still

that the strangeness 1s partially explained.
mysterious,. he adds.

In Personality and Religion, he remarks that the apparent waste or futility in evolution can hardly be regarded -as
really a perfect means to the Derfect end.-'

In other words)

evolution is a difficulty agaiast the omnipotence of God precisely because it does not seem to be a perfect means to the per
feet end.

If we claim that it is a

p~rfect

means and therefore

God is omnipotent, the author cla.ims we ought "in fairness to
the limitations of our experience and kno'lNledge rather to avow
2 Brightman, The l~nd1ni 9l...Q9.!\, 149. We should note
that,Br1ghtmanall along assumes evolution to be an •• tablilhed
ra.ct~: This "fact-, however, is still hypothetical of its nature
)

Brightman, P!l!2na litI

AD4

nllig~gn,

96.
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agnosticism than theism,·4 Unmistakable throughout this whole

passage is the underlying current that God has to use a perfect
means to the perf'ect end if' He is omnipotent..

Hence Brightman's'

conclusion tha') since He does not use this means, Gqd is, therefore, a limited God., S
'Our author again reters to what he believes to be the

imperfection ot· evolution in A fhtJAsophx

.at

l!!l~gism.·

The means used 1n the evolutionary process were wasteful
and cruel in the extreme, and for many millions of years
leem to haVe served no intrinsic value. The tamous La Brea
tar pits in Los Angeles, where mastodons, saber-tooth tigers, and other animals perished, illustrate the suttering
and futility which prevailed tor long ages in evolut1on~6
importance ot this imperfeetion in the evolutionary process

The

is evident "if there is a God in control ot cosmio processes."
Such a God would clearly be responsible tor the operation of

e'''';ausal laws in na:.ture.

It there are causal processes in na,tur

which, apart trom human intervention, lead to evils or "dysteleologie8.l results. as 'Brightman calls them, then !tit is impossibl_
to -avoid' the qllest10n of God's responb1bi11ty for evil. ff7

Ac-

cording to Brightmanfs theory, th1s is only tl!ue it God is omni..

i

,

.,f:

4.

Ib!.st., 96.

5

Ill!; •

6

Brightman, A P'b~J.os9RhX !JJ.. ReJ.;1i;10D.. 247, 248,

7

IRig.

66
potent, If' He Is in control of cosmic processes.
resolves into a dilemma.

•
The qu.estion

Either God is omnipotent and the cause

a! evilJ or He is finite, and something else--lh!

G~v'n--

is the

eause of evil.· F:i..rmly convinced ot Godts goodness, Brightman
preters to believe in God's finiteness.

The whole foundation ot

this method, we must remember, is this' If God were

He would

by

omnipo~nt,

His very nature choose a perfect means to the pertee

end.

This theory would also hold for moral evil.
were able to stop moral evil, He would.

If God

The best summary of

Protessor Brightman's position on this doctrine of optimism 1s
contained in 'lbJt Find1u(i o.t

GQ.d.,

tally, -The Goodness of' God.-

1.n a chapter entitled,. inciden-

It is worth quoting in tull.

Surely, if God were omnipotent beyond our poor power to
conceive, he would have created a race of tree beings who
would always choose righteously (as he himself, being also
free, always chooses righteously), even though in theory
they were free to sin (as he also 1s). There must be something in 8the nature of things. to render impossible the
creation ofa race of free beings who would never sin, even
though they were free to. If it were possible, God would
have created them. The impossibi11ty must lie in the very
nature of God, for if it le.,. merely in the created world,
we should have to ask why God created such a world. There
would have to be something in him which rendered suoh a
creation the best possible--and surely he would always do
,the best possible. This .something in himD is, a:gain, an
aspect of The G1ven.'

67
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aside the strange concept of a God who is free

to sin, we may sa.y that the above pa.ragraph is a logical conclusion trom our author's first premise.

This first premise, how-

ever, seems almos·t to have been thrown 1n as an after-thought,
sort of selt-evident truth which hardly needs mentioning.

1s it?

th~

'Burell! h! (God) "'22J.9. always !'l2

the sense intended

by

It

What

la.u1 l!9ss1bl,.ft In

the author, that premise is untrue.

It

means that God, it He were able, would have made the best possible world.

But is this really correct,

An omnipotent Goel 1s

able to make a million worlds-...ll ot them, taken objectiVely,
more perfect than the present one.

Does not the following seem

more correct. God by His very nature would ha.ve to make the best
possible world, tha.t is, the world belt
PlAn;U in making it?

suit~d ~

B11

glv1nl

With' the statement thus qUB.lified, the

imperfeetions of nature can. be freely acknoli!ledged and still be
expl.ined as the work of e. perfect God.

Thus,although some thin

are imperfect, they are the means He has chosen

&.S

best in ac-

cordance with his ultimate end and purpose in creating this

present world of things,
Let us look at the problem for a moment from a field
other than that of philosophy.

This statement, namely,

t~at

God

only has to create the world best suited to His dIvine purpose,
'$hoti~d

not be hard for Christians to grasp.

Granted that God

hadimade Brightman's -race of free beings who would never sin,"

II
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would Godts goodness have been as foreefully manifested as it
is under the actual cirCUDU£tances'
tion, no Bethlehem, no Calvery$

There would be no Incarna-

Ar~

we not, in the long run,

infinitely better ott as a sinful race v:ith Christ, than we would
have been as a selt-righteous race without Him, come what may?
Is it not at least conceivable that God crea.ted our race, even

though He knew it

,~ould

fallJ that He created it kno-w1ng it was

the desirable means of showing His love and mercy

by

sending a

Redeemer? What was God obliged to do, as a perfect Eeing'
ate a perfect world'

Cre-

No, rather, create a world perfect for Si.

divine purpose; a world in the creation of which He, the Creator,
committed no injustioe.

Tha:t 1s all Godts nature obliged Him

to do in creating.
The further q,uestlon of why God created this present
world is wrapryed in the unfathomable mystery ot God's nature and
His dIVine purpose.

We cannot hope to fathom God.

creature exhaust the Oreator' Can

It

Can the

being of limited intelli-

gence hope to comprehend a Being who is IntellIgence Unlimited?
BrIghtman admits this hiaself as one of the faotors ot the mystery of Goth
,

~he

mystery of God seems to be due to ~o factors. One
factor is human incapacity and ignorance. We cannot penetrate into the heart ot ultimate ,reality; we cannot grasp
, the full sweep of d1vine purpose. It is beyond us. We
finlghtleam to understand ,more of it tor increasing aeons,
yet stIll find mystery ahead. God's nature 1s inexhaustl-
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ble, and man's powers are 11mited. 9

•

Wha:t must be understood, is that it is this false doc
trine of optimism which is at the root of all of Professor
brightman's thought on the problem ot goo.-and-evil.

Unless

this i8 understood, we will hardly grasp the true significance
of his treatment of the problem.

Once it is understood, we can

proceed to a consideratIon of the problem itself.
Analyzing evil a~s it is met with in experience, Professor Brightman catalogues it into five typesl (1) a will that
is more or less incoherent) (2) the intellectual evil of ignoranceJ (3) maladjustment; (4) incom?etence, L~d (5) the dysteleo
10g1cal surd. 10 Concern1n~ this fifth type, the author explains

"A surd in mathematios is a quantity not expressible in rational
numbersJ so a surd 1n the realm of value experienoe is an ev11

not expressible 1n terms of good, no matter wha:t operations are
performed on it. w1l

A surd, then, is someth1ng which is entirel

evil; there i$ no port1o~no aspect of good in it at all. This
undoubtedly 1s the worst ot all evils,
The other types may sometimes be superseded by internal
development, an incoherent will may become relatively more
;coherent, ignorance may be enlightenedJ maladjustments may
be overcome by proper relationships; and incompetence may
be lupplanted by skill. But a dysteleolog1eal surd 1s a

..

I!
9
10

lRiS., 164, 165.
Brightman, A PhiJ.9sop):rv .9.t. n§J:~g1oIb 244 .. 245.
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type of evil which 1s inherently and irreducibly evil and
contains wi~hin itself no principle of development or improvement. 1
For Professor Brightman, then, the question of ev11
resolves ins elf into the question of surd ev11.

Other evils may

be eXplained away, but this one alone remains to point the way
to Godfs finiteness.

1IThe problem ot evil in its most acute fo

1s the question whether there 1s surd evil, and so,. what its
relation to value is."l.3

But Professor Brightma!1 1s not clear

about whether these surds actually do exist.

1tIt 1s debateable,

he says 1n one place, whether there are dysteleologlcal surds,
it is conceivable that such surds may exist.,,14

In another, "If

there be any truly surd evil, then it 1s not in any sense an instrumental good; good comes in sotte of it, not because of it."lS
From this hypotbet1cal thinking, our author passes to categorica
conclusions without offering any really solid proof.
actually defines surd evil in so many words.

He never

He gives examples

of surd evil, but tails to pro",. that they are surd evil.
us look at them.

We will find the.t they are explainable in

some other wa.y.

):

11

~.,

244, 245.

12

~.,

24" ·246.

13

~.

14 1b1d.,246 •
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Take, for example, the phenomenon of imbeCility. Let us
grant that imbecility may encourage psychiatry and arouse
pity; yet,' if it be an incurable condition, there remains
in it a surd evil embodied in the intrinsic worthlessness
ot the imbecile's existence f.l'-.~ the sutfering ,,:hieh his
existence imposes on others.}'t:>

The prineiple mistake in Brightman's considertaion ot
imbecility 1s his viewpoint.
tirely from this life.

To

He is looking at the situation en-

astimat~

the condition rightly, it is

necessary to consider the whole of man's existencG, bothbetore
and after death.

Without going into a disc'u!lsion of immortality

tor that would be beyond the scope of this present inquiry, we

must 88Y that it is only in the light of the next lite that the
condition of imbecility can be understood.

An imbecile, althoug

his reason is lmdeveloped, Is, nevertheless, a

man~

As a man

he is destined for perfect happiness in the next life if he live
a moral life and is baptized.

Being capablt of no moral evil,

sinee he is not responsible for his actions, a baptized imbecile
is assured of Mt'miness in the next life.

How, then, can Bright

man speak of "the intrinsic worthlessness of the imbecile'S ex-

istence'"

He has not followed his own

consideration.
pr"e,nt life.

stan(h~rd

of taking into

J!l. tke facts. He has limited himself to

the

Certainly imbeCility, looked at in this light.

oannot be considered a surd evil.
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Evolution provides us w1 th another of BrIghtman" s examilles of surd evil. Already in this chapter17 we have quoted
our author when he speaks of the femous La Bree. tar pits.

Se

states tha:t the remains of prehistoric animals found in these
pits 1tlllustrate the suffering and the futility which prevs,iled
for long ages in evolut1on. w18

Instead, do not the La Brea pits

seem to be more an ev1dence ot Divine Providence?

It is by .....

ot them that God has -provid.ed man with actual

about the ani ....

da.t&

mals which inhab1ted the earth in prehistoric times.

The dina..

saul', mastodon, saber.... tooth tiger end other extinct animals B.re

not examples of the futility of evolution.

They are, rather,

examples of the tremendous variety and ingenuity of the Divine
crea.t1ve Power,

These a.nimals have adequately s.rv.d their

Pllr..

pose if the memory of them and their remains are signs to mt.nkind

of the power of God.

There .1s no need for Qod to keep their

species in existence.

'ben these animals existed, they served

to give material praise to their

Creato~.

Even though they are

now extinct.. the signs and evidences O.t' their former
gi~es

like Draise to God.

&nicnls, that is

~nother

exist~nee

As for the suffering of these and othe

vroblem.

In a previous che:pter it was pointed out that

J:

17

cr •. above,

is

Brightman, A Pb412fpbY~ Be11g1gn, 248.

page 65.

surr~r1n
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If animals was a difficulty tor John Stuart Mill. l9

briefly in answering Brightman's

~epeat

tlready said to Mill.

ditt~iculty

We can only
what we have

The advantages of sensation and the plea...

Jures animals enjoy through it far outweigh the psin
lnd there felt.
~ven

is here

.Animals are tBr better otf having sensst1on,

though pain is sometimes occasioned by it, than they would

)e without sensation.

Agsin the pain of an1mals seems to be tar

Less in· intensity than that of human beings.

Finally, it would

a continual miralle on the part of God to give animals

~equ1re
l

tl~t

sense nature which could en30y pleasures, anast!ll withold

suftering from them.
sL~ce,

This miracle animals have no right to,

in fact they have no rights at all.

'It intellect a.nd will hE-va rights.

Neither does (lod owe this

airacle to His own Justice or goodness.
~rightlllan t

Only beings possessed

For these reasons, then.

s arguments for the fini tenes 5 of God baceuse of the

sutf9ring in

~11mal$

appear to be invalid.

the same may be said ot his arguments from ftth~ appar~nt waste or futility of evolut1on.- 20 It evolution 1s tru~J

md that still l·emains to be proved concl'IJ.si',ely,"'-indeed, it is

,f such a nature tl't.at it ean never be so proved-.... even so, eV'olu-

;ion is not an indication of
..

·1.:19
i

20

cr.

?at,ge 9

Brightman,

w~ste

by the divine goodness.

tr.
flrmODllttxJD4

Be11gton, 96.

It
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is rather an instance of the lavishness ot the divine wisdom
which has lett for mankind a sign o.f Godin everything, "tongues
in trees, books in the running brook, sermons in stones, snd good
in everything ••21
Our consideration of Brightman's treatment ot the problem af gaod-and-evil hsCs advanced this far,

We have seen the

imoartance the author puts on the existence of surd evil) we have
also seen his tailure to prove that there is such a thing
eVil.

8S

surd

The tact of Lmbecility and that of evolution can be ade-

quately explained without the invention of surd evil.

author give any other exam?les of surd evil?

Does our

This is what

Bright~

man states .in a general way about the surdl
What has been said about the futilities and the waste of
evolution may be extended to apply ta all the Rsurd evil"
which figures so prominently in the entire problem of' good..
and-evil. There seems to be evil in the universe so cruel,
so irration~l, so unjust tha.t it could not be the work of
a good God,22

Moral evil can hardly be called surd evil and used as
admits that
Rmoral evils may be explained as a result of human freedom •• 23

&.

proof' for God's finiteness.

Professor Brightman

Surd evil, then, would be restricted to natural evil, which

,!:

21

William Shakespeare, A,s

22

Brightman,

23 l.h!S., 260.

A PGilosopUx

lm!

~

I;t, II, 1.

~! Reli~ion,

318.
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"?lould include pain, disease, death, earthq.uakes, and tornadoes •

••• ,,24 But are these 'Phenomena so "inherently and irreducibly
evil'"

Let us examine them and see.
The' possibility of pain in animals, vie have seen, is

necessary if they are to enjoy sensation.

The good sensation

brings them far overshadows the evil of ?ain.

This is also true

of man, but th.ere is the added fact that pain in man ca..1'1 be the
cause of a higher good.

By suffering pain man is often forced

to turn to God and to lead a good moral life B.fter he ha.s sinned
There is no comparison in value

b~tween

the good tha.t results

and the physical evil which occasions it.

For both the converte

sinner and the saint, pa1n can be the occasion of merit for the
next life.

Thus, far from being a surd evil, pain cam be a tre-

mendous beneti t to man.

What "e he.ve said of 1')ain app11es also

to disease.
Death 1s not entirely evil either.
the natural result of their composit.ion.

In animals it is

It is not the good of

the individual but rather the common good of the species which 1.
of prime impor.tance where animals are considered.
,

Thus an indiv

be.

du.l flLnimal can"and often is sacrificed for the good of the
'f

~

group.

..

We see an instance of this in certain kinds of spiders

r~----

__________________________

~
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does are also olassed by Brightman in the category of intrinsic

evils.

But wha.t is s. flood or an ea.!'thquake, a tornado or a

storm at sea?
power.

Are they not supreme manifestations of the divine

Man realizes his insignificant -power '?rhen he experiences

the tremendous torce of a hurricane.

He realizes that the dif·

ference between God's might and his weakness illimitable.
themselves these

are but eVidences to

phenomen.a.

mighty God still reigns.

man

In

that an Al-

In addition to this, they are Often

the occasion of moral pur§;& t1on.

FrecCuently in the wake of the

natural disorders that upset our lives men aclmowledge their
sinfulness and turn to God.,

This higher

passes any am.oun.t of physical evil.

s~iritual

good far sur-

One soul alone 1s

priceless~

In conclusion" vte can stDte that Brightma.n ha.s failed.
to prove tr.at such a thing as surd evil exists.

Every exam'i.)le

of surd evil that he proposes can be explCined adequately in

another way.

His theory of surd evil has been the result of

not adhering to his own standard of considering all the fa¢ts.
Be sometimes limits his viewpoint to this life instead of judging by eternal values.

At other times he oonsiders the evil of

the individual rather than viewing the good of the whole of crea
Again he remains on the mere physical plane, instead of
viewing

~hings

from the higher mOTal plane.

His theory of surd

'aviV: h~s resulted from a failure to see the whole question in

pel'!,spect1ve.

For this reason we must relect Brightman-s theory.
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If we except his mistaken undertone of optimism and
h1s acceptance of surd evil, we can agree that Professor Brightman hils himself gj.ven a rather aceurs.te answer to the objections

arising from the problem of evil in the world.
earlier ".forks, 1hl frobl •
First, much ot the
suffering p'arlfies
':rondly, moral evil
of the divine gift

evil to us
unknown to

maY2~e
U8.

In one or his

.s;t pod, he gives three explanations.

natural evil is a wholesome discip11ne.
::,nd obstacles strengthen the soul. Se~
is & necessary-consequence of the abuse
of freedom. Thirdly, mu.ch that seems
tiue to the fact that Oed's purposes are

solutions to the ?roblem of evil.

The first three of these seem

to do a rather thorough job ft'ff e:!1.8wering msny of

of this problem.

t~e

d1fficultie

The three solutinns he enill!lerates arel (1) LIO-

ral evils may be explained 8.S a. rsS'ul t of human fre-9dom.

moral evils are sometimes viewed

~s &

:m.'1.ishrnGnt
.
for moral (,vils.

(3) Non-moral evils, if not pencd J may be regarded
ary_

(2) lfo4

6.S

d.isciplin ...

Let us consider each of there three m.ore in detail.
The ext)lane.tion thE t mOl"1.1 evils result f'rom human

freedom is a satisfactory

one~

Frightman indicatee t1w.t ttmuch

weicht may be granted to this ergumel'lt,,,26
f

:

Vatk.'s and Bosanquet's objeetions to

):

n:U~l'lts

Fh~ holds that Klmtfs

free will are !.

25

Bri.ghtman, ~ Prg:£\§1J :;:!.. God. 160.

26

Brightman,

A Ph!losonnz 2!

R~b!glQn,

260.

~r1 ••q
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~ and unempirical.

H~ver, Brightman finds it hard to recon-

cile a saying from St. Paul that aGod is faithful, and will not
sutfer you to be tempted above that which you are able," (I Cor.,
10, 13) with the tact ot human sin.

Human freedom, then; while

it explains much of the moral evil in the world, is not entirely
satisfying for Brightmanl
Nevertheless, human freedom leaves many aspects of evil,
even moral evil, unexplained. Why are there in the nature
of things, independent of human choice, so many temptations
and alluresents to evil choices so utterly debasing and
disasterou..' ••• Freedom, we repeat, explains much of the
moral eVil, but it does not explain either the toree of
tem-ptation or the debasing consequences of moral e\1i1. 27
It we explain the torce of temptation as a result.of
the concupiscence of our tallen nature and even the existence

ot a devil, and finally as a means God uses to increase our
"it, we see that this objection is rea,sonably answered.

me~

The be....

basin, consequences of moral evil may be explained as the result
of our rebelling against Almighty God and violating the integrit
of our God-given nature.

Human freedom, consequently, stands OU

.:s the essential answer to the problem of moral evil.
Brightman rejects the second solution ot evil, that
no~mpral
t

'

evils are sometimes a punishment for moral evils.

His

reason tor entirely rejecting this theory is that lIit is repug-

27

~.,

260, 261.
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nant to the ethical sense ot modern idealists.-

•

Even criminology has repudiated the motive of punishment in favor of the reformation of the criminal. Sblll a
good God harbor resentment? noes perfect love punish' FUrther, the llnjust distribution of nonmoral evils, both intrinsic and instrumental, makes it imposs1ble to suppose
that any consistent desire to punish affords an explanation
ot more than a few evtl••• ,The whole theory.ot punishment
as a solution to the problem ot evil collapses of its own
weight. 28
'
Our author oocas1onally injects a bit of divine revelation into his philosophy to augment his arguments.

There is

an instance of it here. 'This crude theory ot punishment was rejected by th. writer ot the book of Job and by Jesus (according
to John, 9# 3),_29

The citation of the gospel reters to a oure

Jesus worked on a man blind since his birth.

Christ.s disciples

had asked Him. whether the man himself or his parents had sinned
that the man was afflicted with blindness,

Our Lord replied tha

neither the man himself nor his parents wer'S being t)unished for

sin in th1sb11ndness.

Rather, Christ explained, the blindness

had occurred in order that Godes works be manifested through
this blind man.

There~on

Christ healed the man ot his blindness

From this single instance it 1s hardly correct to say that Jesus
rej.~ted

the theory ot punishment.

Our Lord Himself told the

pa1al~tl0 at the pool of Bethsaida to sin no more lest something

):

28

~.,

29

~.

261, 262.
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worse happen to him (John, 5,

14). The classic

exam~le

•

of pun-

ishment for sin 1$ found in the Book ot Genesis, chapter lS,
verse 19.

There we read of the d1struction of Sodam and Gomor.-

rah bleAu.e 2t the §1nfYka!ID s!

~hefte

two

~~th!"

Other ex-

am:ples could be cited trom the Old Testament of plagues, wars,
famine, and disease which were sent to punish a nation or an individual tor sin.

But because these pertain to revelation they

cannot be accounted as philosophioal evidenee here,
To 8ay that God w111 not punish rebellion against Him--

.1n, in other words--is to falsity the idea ot God.
onlyaoo4J He is also just.

God is not

In faot, 1f God did not punish evil

would He not aotually be encouraging sin? Men,being what they
are, would take advantage ot this one-sided goodness of God and
behave when it was oonvenient for them to bel'..ave.

Thus, the

just man would be the one to sutter, for both he and the unjust
man would be treated alike by God.

We can see,then, that not

only would God be encouraging Sin, but the whole.order of justic
wo~ld

be unbalanced.

Such a notion contradicts the very idea ot

God, it also contradicts seriJ)ture,.'O

Although God des1res.the salvation of all, Bcriptur
In Th
~o}f.Q.! !1gdo~ (3, 10), we reade. "The wicked shall be punished
. .acco;idIrig tohelr sins." In St. Matthew: "These shall go into
'eve~iastin, punishment" (Matt., 25, 46).
'0

has many instances of His punishing unrepentant sinners.
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There is a two-told aspect ot punishment.
to the offender, the other looks to society.

•

One looks

Criminology may

iavor the reformantion of the criminal, but that does not hinder
us from olosing the prison doors on thousands of criminals every
year.

Such a punishment ser'tes to achieve two endsl (1) to re-

form the individual offenders, and (2) to serve as a warning to
other members ot society whomight be tempted to commit orime.
Some punishment does not attain both these ends entirely.

The

electric chair may not reform a murderer, but it does serve to
reform society as a whole, and it restores balance to the order
of justice.

Without punishment, justice would soon become a

mockery.
It is, then, precisely because God favors the repentence of sinners that He sometimes sends them natural evils as

punishments for their sins.

Wltness the terrible social disease

that often rollow the misuse 'Of sex.

Is it hard to see in them

a punishment for sin as well as a str'Ong induoement to Ilve
good moral live?

11

No, the theory that non-moral evils are some-

times a punishment for moral evils 1s a sound one.

The w'Ord

10fP..'Uilt!!, however, is an important part 'Of the explanation of

purtlsbment.

This explanation 'Of evll can be and ls, from time

to time, misapplled.

But these misapplications do not hinder

·1 t item remaining an integral part of the complete explanation

ot fhe problem of evil.

r

•

the third solutlon to the problem of evil 1, that nonmoral evil•••y be regarded a. disciplinary.

Protes.or Bright.

man cautiously admits there is .ome truth to thIs explanation,
but he conclude. that -the whole theory ot evil as dlaeipl1nal'Y

ralls tar short of belng phl1oso~hioal1y adequate.",l In his:
oonsideration of this third solution, BrIghtman uncovers an objection and otter. a solution to it.

Both are worth noting,

W. find that sometime. evil fact. are explained as actually
le.din, to nobler and more spil'ltual living, also that
Barlettme,--and pel"M'P8 more frequently-evil facts lead
to mO.1'e and more resentful, debased, depre,.ed, and hopeles
11"11ng .... Detend.rs or this disciplinary viewf however, re....
tort that th.,. facts do not show a lack ot diSCiplinary
intent on God •• part, 01" even &. le-ok of wisdom, justice,
or power. but indicate the presente ot a misuse of'~tre.dom
by man in the taee of disciplinary opportun1t1es.'4
J..tter making this analys:!s, Brightman proceeds to prob

d •• pe1' into the heart of disciplinary ev11.

Because he presup-

poses that diSCipline ia the purpose of all ..il, the author

set. up two conditions that disciplinary evil should meet.

Fir.·

and foremost, these evils should appear wherever they are needed.
&n:d only when they are needed.
1y 64apted to their end.

Secondly, they should be perfect

W. realise the first cond! tion is un-

ne••••ary _hen .e freely admit that discipline 1s not the

ot

ail evil,
j,'

that it 1s not the total answer to the nroblem.

'1 Brightman, ! Pb!lolSRbI !itt. B!:L!s:19B. 262.

,2

~rpQ.

Ib~.,

262, 263.

!h

,
..

freedom and d1scipline. But neither freedom nor disoipline
nor the two taken together approaoh a complete or ooherent
account of aotual evil.35
Freedom and d1sotp11ne and punishment are all parts of
the total solution to the problem of evil.

Another important

part of the entire answer is the fact that God frequently uses
physical evil to achieve a higher spiritual good.

All these

pa rts taken together still do not give a complete solution.

To

know that, 1';e would have to comprehend the purposes of God. This

last 1s the all-important lin..\( we must not torget.

The parts of

the solution here offered do give a coherent and reasonable aooount of evil.

They seem to go as far as human limitations can,

to solve a problem which is both human and divine.

If the existenoe ot natural evils does not contradict
the omnipotence of God, and since moral evil can be classified

as an abuse by men ot their freedom, there seems to be no just
reason to argue against the infinite nature of God
e.

pr~ence

of evils in the l/orld.

neve~htele$s,merit

from the

The G3.vep of Brightman should,

some consideration, since it constitutes a

striking and impr:l:rtant feature of our author's own explanation

ot, evil.
,;-

;

chapter.
J.'

~

G1.'!h then, will be oonsidered in the concluding

•
CHAPTER V

THE OIVENt CONCLUSION
The concept of e. "Given" did not originate with Edgar
S. Brightman.

Although he did not use the same name, John Stuar

Mill wrote about the same idea in his work, Xln:ee Essays 9l! Ii!U.
gion, published in lS74.

Analyzing experience, Mill finds

tl~t

there are preserving agencies and destroying agencies present in
the world. l These latter, he says, we might be tempted to 8Seribe to the will of a different Creator.

But Mill passes over

this temptation to dualist'l, stating that it cannot be supposed
-that the preserving agencies are wielded
stro11nC ageneies by another. ft

by

one Being, the

(1, ....

His reason 1s that 8the destroy-

ing ag~eie:s are a necessary part of the preserving agencies."
Mill attributes the imperfeetions in the universe either ftto the
shortcomings in the worlananship as regards its intended purpose,
or to external foreesnot under the control of the workman.

ft

Millts "Given" would seem to be only external matter
ex~1'lnsle to God.
~.

Mill describes his ftGiven" in these words.

'

1

Mill, Three ESia!! on Religion, 185.
86

87

..

We may conclude, then, that there is no ground in Natural
Theology for attr1buting 1ntelligence or personality to
the obstacles which partially thwart VThat seems the purposes ot the Creator. The limitation or his power more
probably results either tram the qualities ot the material
-.the substances and forces ot which the universe 1s eomposed not admitting ot any arrangements by which his purposes could be more completely fulfilled, or else, the purpo •• a might halte been more tally attained, but the Creato!'
did not know how to do it; creat1ve skill, wonderful as it
is# was not sufficiently perfect to accomplish his purpose,
more thoroughly.2

'rote. SOl" Brilht.an goes into some deta.il to explain
hts theo" ot these .obstacles which partially thwa.rt wh&t seem
the pur,oses ot the Createrr. 'It

nam. ot

Ib! PiYIa-

To these obstacles heglves the

His proof' tor the existence ot

lhl

g&VIQ

118. in the tact that there 1s evil in the world which cannot
be imputed to san.'

-the difficulties undeiwh1ch the divine wi1

evident.ly labors in expressin, the perfection desired 1n the

world• •lso &11'e evidence to the beliet -that there 1s an .ternal Given .,leaent in divine experience. whioh is not the produet
ot divine wl11.-4 An example otth•• e dlttleult!es 1•••en in

the slow and paintul process.. ot lite, and 1'n the presence of
earthquake., cyclones, and disease germs in the world.
It 1s in 1U. P:ul?J.s 9.t.
,

>

I

III

,

11

4

,

GQ~

that Brightman introduce'

b I

2 lll.14. # 186 •
. 1.:

):

Brightman.

l.hi PIP!!• • .slt. .Q9!., 126 •

.4 .na&. j 127.

'\
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hi. theory ot %ba

9txII-

Hi. definition of lhl

~ItD

•

1s really

the latter half' of h!s definition of God.
There 1s within him God in addition to hts reason and
hi' oreat!•• will. a passive element ~h1ch enters into
everyone ot his conscious states, as sensation, instinot,
and impulse enter into ours, and constitutes a problem 1'01'
h~.
This element we eall The Given. The ev11s of life
and the delays in the atta1nftent of value, in $0 tar as
they come trom God and not from human freedom; are thus
due to his nature, yet not wholly to his deliberate choice.
Ris will and reason acting on The G1vErn produce the world
and aeh.leve value in 1t. S
We seetrom this deS0ri'Ptive definition that Brightman

dlff'~r&

trom lUll on this theory, and ls, at thes&me tae, more detinitti
than )lUI.

Brightman's theory is thBt the obstael$s to God's

purpose, the lbt1tat1on of God's power, is something internal
to God.

It 1s

&l ~nts$ntial

ark of the dlvine na.ture.

1. th. $ource of an eternal problem to God.

l:a!.

GiV',.l

It ls irrational.

In itself" it 'cannot be Wlderstood, yet an under,tanding u.s.

uy be made of tt, and through the conquest and shaping of' it
aea..'ling may be achieved.· 6

OUr author gives five aspeets of' lh!

Q1!~

whioh need

to be eonsidered 1n order to understand the theory. l.b!. GiXfm
is $:M1g1g11s, tor -it 1s conseious

ex~eriance

of God ••• There 1s

f,· ,;

no.' uQ.scious matter in <led."
,

iii:

1,:

u ,

,

ll?!t!1. , 113.
6 tbJrd .• , 18,.

It 1s SSiUJPdtlil11t1 t stands for the
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entire unereate4 and eternal nature

.s

a partially distorting and

act of God.
It is

or

delB:~t1ng

•
God ••• Thls Given enters

factor into every eret.tive

Tia., alao, 1s an aspect ot the complex Given.-

It.mll;

otherwise, it would have to be a d1--;1ne creation.

It is impossible to cone.love of God's creating

~h6

present sort

or world unless there is·something in God which renders such

at

creation the O$st POi3ible,; that someth.tng ... is the

Given . . "

lnt~U"UlJ.

It is

tg

,gggJ

et{~!'n~l

it limits him. ·withln as truly

as "WithQut ••• an uncreatad eternal limitation, within the divine

nature.·

It is

.".ml~l"ol~ed

qI

Oed: -It explains the presence

ot

the horrIble evils and dlstortlons ••• But allot these factors
are patiently

tEiCed

by the divine goodness $nO our of them aj.l

God brings meaning ••'1

This view, Brightman remarks, 1$ an Ropen_

eyed and honest- view of thQ goodness ot God"

It l"eeognl.e.

.nw.

7 Brightman •
Zln.4m& !!l!..i9.sl, 174-177. Our author
gIves his five $,spects of :the' Given, in this section. One rather
amusing aspect of The Gtven reflects, it sElultmi.l, Brighton's
I~hodlst baclqround.. .thi SUS]'jlg is .upt a teetotaler; JfTh(3

thought of The GIven has an inspiring aspect. The hinderances
to value with which lite abounds are not simply to be accepted
as the'will ot God. 1hey are rather that against wh1eh God is
battling" and he invites us to join the battle ••• OUr faith may
reply that God has no deSire that there shall be amy alcohol;
its presence thus tar 1s the outcome of Godtl struggle "11th The

GIVeth,

~f

we join with God in the struggle, it may be that al-

cohol tItll alway. exist but at least its evil eonatequenoes oan
be overcome, 1t men w11i conquer the appetite tor drink, refuse
to use alcohol as $ bever_sa and join with God in driving it out
or its present plaC'e of uttery over human wills and bodfss and
h.app1n$s~..

(~.,

181)

...
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the evils ot lit. and doel not try to sugar-coat them.

•

wan the

other hand 1t does not ascribe them to God's w1ll and thus make
him

be

so remote trom all that we know of goodness as to
almost a monster. e'
~GrallY

In sp1te of Brlshtman t s lengthy descript1on, it 1s not
altogether 01••1" 3ust what the exact nature ot l'.b& g1v!n is. It

wst be either a being or a non-bein,.

It" it is a non-being,
certainly it cannot b.~~ source of problem and task to God. w9
It it 1s a being, it must be either ereated or unereated.

Pro-

f.ssor :Brightman hold. that we eould never knoVJ why God would

create .ueh a thing.lO The Given, he conclude., is wan uncreatad limitatIon. ell fo avoid the diff1culties of dualism, which
appear to be insoluble, our author makes
within the nature of God.

lh! gilt;

a limitation

thIs limitation, how.vEll', is the _tel'

nal source ot the evil against which God is struggl1nth

God,

then, must be thought ot as struggling alalnst the evil ot which

His eternal nature is the souroe.

God, in other words, is

St1ll.. Brightman's concept ot God 1.
supremely good wl11. tt12 And he claims

struggling with himselt.
that ot •• Person
f ,

1~

or

¥

8 Xblg.., 178.

.,

Ibl Eta»••;

~

God, 183.

11 Brl,htman,!tIlt. l!nd1I!1 9l.

A9.!!, 177.

9 Brightman,
10 Ib1s1 •
2.

.:tb j d.,

il'~.
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that:hl. gillD 'st;;anda tor the entire unere.ted and ete:rnal-nature.
There.\ ,appears to be a· eon tradiQtion in having God

of God. w13

- .. Person of lSu}lre!emely good w1111 and an "entire uncl'eated and
eternal nature'

th!~.t

is passive and a problem. tor God.

BoW' can

Codls natu.re be a : problem to Hlmself. how can it be passive, it

1t 1s supposed tha-A.t God is uncrea ted and eternal'
ture 1s composite..

It God's na-

and trom what we have already seen of Bright.

man theory, it can .. hardly be concluded ethen-ise, then He cannot
be uncreated and e-·ternal.
and

Composition as such is an inrperfectl0

could only hav.-. as it' ultimate source a perfect Being who

ta alto simple.

r."O

Also, in

oreated.

Bright.an has made
(Jondulion 1s to

make God composite. then, is to make Him
trying to avoid the difficulties of dualilm,

~

lWt 2&'9'G itlternal to God. But

b.~.

'What

drawn than that this theory ot

other

Dl Q!II.D

makea God the supr•••e principle Gf both ,ood and ev11]

Dualism

1s not .'9"01484.

Iit 1. simply drawn into the very Godhtt.4,

God 1. a .Person

o~

supremely lood will,' and at the lame time

wbich

W~

must re...ber is an essential part ot God"

~g~jD#

tOJ!

nature, is tht9 sOUn"ce of all ev11, excepting that caused by hu-

Ilan t"..doa.
~:

,

Thus the

theory ot The Given does not solve the prob-

1 •• or ev11, nor dc:x')e. it .bsGlve God from the ltatural ev11s ot

·earthitUake.,
tend~

cyclo~es,

and di8ease..

The theory ot

lba gll!U

to pre,.". tbaft which its inventor wanted it to disprove.
1.3.

Ibid.,

175

92 •
In short, it i8 self-contradictory, for it make. God both suprem
11' good and at the same ttae the source ot ev11.
It has been shown that the whole theory ot

.lbl

G~!m

was proposed by Brightman as a solution to the problem ot evil.
e.pecially the problem. ot surd eVil.

But sinee he has failed

to prove that surd evil exists, since all other evils ean be
rattonally explained without calling on .1l'a gj.Y!lh and since the
very theol!')" ot

lba GtYIll contains a note of

selt-contradiction,

it seems only reasonable to reJect Brightman t • explanation.
In Chapter X ot his \fork,

A ~h'lQ!9Phl

.Q[ l!l~&ipD'

Bright• • lists tive main obJections to the position ot an intinite God. ·'a a

$~ry

and conclusion of this thesis, a brier

refutation ot these objections of our author will be attempte<1.
By this refutation, it is hoped that the stability

ot theistic

absolutism will be shown) and .. at the lame time, the .eakn.e••••

ot theist:tc tinitis.,Moovere4.

Brightman summaria.s his ob-

3ections thus,
'!'here are five objections to theistic absolutism which,
taken together, render it a highlX improbable view. These

are (1) its appeal to ignorance, (2) its ascription ot

surd • .,11s todlvtne will, C,) itl tendency to make good
indistinguishable, (4) it. cutting the ne"e ot
. moral endeavor, and (S) it. unempiriea1 character. Let
us consider these in o1"4e1".14

~,and ev11

,.,

¢

r

JI

) 4$

r
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1U IRPM6 sa ..arM..

(1)

•

*:he ""l\1Mnt tor the-

1.tle ab.olutl•• ,· BP11ht.an claima, "entai18 the adais8lon that

we

O&lIDOt

1D~u.tl.

a"old

explain the surd eVU8--tbe wa.te, the crueltJ', tbe

or . t. .--&.4 ,bat we

u.dle.~

1IUat

adJd.t

OUl'

To

1pOraDoe. tf

"pet1t10n, we wUl liIl1t OUNely.s to the

clar,.

t:tat the ,o.l'loa
ot aa 1Df1D1te God. .ppeals to l_eNn- to
,
,

"Plaia t . . .l1a ot

the wOI'14.

We Will 'Nat

.....~ w1~ . . .eeond o'bt!eotlOll.

ot s.devU when

lathe tOJeI01Dc cMpter.

we baye a1NacJr PN..Dt.4 ••vera1 reasOD&l_ uplanatlOll8 tor
tll. pre,e.ce ot art1 111 the wor14.

tM tI'M'OII

or an

.. ~s.u-a' tor

1ac ..

~"r

_r1t.,

t.

ws,.1l.

lIoN.l ."Ula .xpla1ae4 'b7

la-.oral ....11

oa:tl

.111, .. disclpllDa1'1 "CtlO11,

be explalned

.. IleaDI of

a•

en.Ct-

.p1r1tal 1004, .. '.stine crollDcl and . 1 tor us to

peater~.

We ..4II1t that 1ft 1I141v14-.1 . s•• one

or all of '''.e uplaatiOll' . , Dot be tM

GU~it

solution,

tor we . . IMtftI' coapreb.eJl4 the dlva. PVPO'.' in perllitt1n,
natural evU. Thu is not, .traDle. We an lla1t.ct oreatures
and oarmot upen to exhaut the lmow.b1l1\7 ot tbe Creator.

BriP"" h1rIIelt a4ld.t. onll .. part1&l upl . .tla 1. pOssible:
U Get 18 Ute 0.1,0"'" be1q he 18 trad1tlouU, be11e..4
to bet 1\ 1•••17
tbat he ha. cho.eR the 110w and
,OO"lr ..... ot •••lut1_ tertlle ....tlon. of Ute. It he
'18 11ll1t.4 .., the ."1'Ml en.tence of uner_ted liven expu1ea.. With1ft h1a _t'are. tM .tra. .x. •• 11 pa»t1allY
••plaiDed aDd 1Dt.l'preted. but it 18 still
1.5

.'ftJl&8

..,'.1'10•.

.J:
,

•

DJ. IIB.PSlr2B 9l. .Il1r4 Ua.. 12 <St!'J.Dt

(2)

.. 00114

o'b~.ltlon

~t

Bright. . saU
••Uti"

IO'eOe

Tb1•

Prot.s.or

tbel1t1c ab801uti.a "oarmot axp1&111 the luret

SlOW he .448 tat "An uphola..:t-

ult1ate

nrl',

11 not' exactl,. aoeurate.

w~~"

or aU

.

,

ot

.

that Y1." Bst tind t
.

,

.

'

.v4 evUa in the wl11 ot Ood." It-7

be 1&14 1Jl '*-plJ , _ , it ·absolutua -.rulet expla1rl sV4 evil, it

18 8s..ply _ _ _8 there 18 no 8uGb th1.ns.

bd 1t tMN 1s no

.
'1:d.Dc. we . . !w.Hl7 a.elbe 1t to the 41Y1ne
nU.
.

'

Br1shtan ._ ,.., to otter &UI1 luba1:lant1al proot tor the exilt.nee
• \tell

8" artl.

ot

• utt• .ri.q

So

tar his -1Js upaeat tor 1t .eeu to beth•

t.·

u1.1s aBc! tille ......
1B evolution. Both ot
.en uplauMni 1ft the torego1llc obapter, where 1t ...

in

, . , . baYe

"~4o\t't ,"*t tbe

po.alble .1IIttel'1nI 1n an1-.l1 i l

'UN

."'81-

"'a" b.r \he very ..
ot ...t1ent belDc. aad ,bat the plea...... tar oawelp the 8'Utter1n1 1rl u.S.l 11te" 1' ... alao
al1011il 'M' ........, ... in ",olution 1. aor. an ....plAt at the
lana.e., and. pro41pl1tr of d1V1M
Ct,1ft, thlthel'laq4"

lUI. lIaMad,l' Irish'an

book.

-7'

..... ~'1DC
ot."lertlah 1n • liven
..
,:.

,1

J

.

po_,..

%bI

on.,.

IDA Slal$b '" lJ'».

"tbat the a_bel' of t1sh
~\1t•.1.

aboll'

t-.,

eq_1 'p the
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ber of drops ot water going over :Ni.gara, Falls 1.n that lllimlte."
Our author &,ppears to eonelder this taot "collo.mal waste in the

lire processes. tt

.A eOJlPlete anSWer to this d1f't1aulty woul.d re...

quiro reterenee to variety and order in the universe, to the goo
of a,ctiT1tYt and to the enlightening ot

tUU'l.

Here 'We will only

ask it there 1s anythinl so intrinsically wrong about
lower tish used to sustain .. hi,gher type of fish..

havL~,

a

t>~oc ....

This

•••s more a tremendo11s argument tor the divine Providence ot

God.

Witb all those billions of fish eating billion. of fish

every minute, our lake., str6ams,

~nd

with plentiful fish of all varieties.

oceans still remain stocke
We can, only begin to im-

agine the terrible evil that would result from the ov..r .. sur'pl:u.s
of fish it they 41d not 6at one another.
Let us tak$ tbat sue example

ot the fish to .ho.... the

inconsistency otBrlgbtman's position on %hi. giYln as an explana
tion ot surd evil.

Our author would consider the waste ot fish

a surd evil whioh 1& necessitated by Jb!

g1x!Q.

God would l1ke

to do sOllethin.i to sti,ve all those fish, but lIe does not hflve the
powu.

Yet Brightman a180 tells us plainly that l'.bi g;tUD

-studs fer the entire Mereated and eternal nature
ThU,' Vi;e can Justly ar,u., (1)
4;HI

.

,

or

God.._18

IWi gi!ID is theoause or

SUN

<

17

J:rilhtun, A. Pb.1J.tSUI 9l2bl Ji.l. ll'lJ&~oQ, 315, '16 •

16 Bl-l,htm.an, lb!.

r~~1

Rt.§sA" 175.
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evil.
(3)

(8) hti

nt. ga.xM .tana

!beNton, the entue

8 ...11.

~

.hOW GaD

,8

BrlPt_n ••

•

tor the ent1re _tUN of God.

ot God 1. th. e&lI.. ot tM.
God ,. .11pre-17 pod and tbe _._ ot eT11'
_tllN

that 'M1ltlo a_olutl•• 1. wrolll .cause 1:t a.-

erll1aa lurd enl '0 the 41...ue wUl.

Altho. Br1lhtart bas Dot

,""4 'hf 8xllt._ ot 1V4 ....11, hi.

loal.l.T lead t. aeelbal 8...11 to

Dl StUtaIl

(S)

~

01Ift

positlon would 101-

41Y1ae _tUM ..

.u. ....94 _

m~

i.PAI1iWaytJr

_.rce.

trOll Br1&ht. . ' s idea that "a\)Sol.e \Mlall en_ll. the propo.1:tloa tbat all apparent enl 1.

,.... !bi' d1tt1Ctllt,

"&117 1004 ••19 Br18htaa wo1l14 ar_ tbat tr_ the a.o1\1t1lt I

rt...

'both 1004 aDd evU are . . .4 '" \he diy1De wUl Qd are

iMnta

1004.

Belle. .,.1 18 ... Walte 604, hoWn'er. __ a

o1Mr 41.tunloD between 1004 .,.4 . .U.

cood aad ••U. \he dlst1not1cm 11 ...err

III ,be ••• of Il0l'&1

~iD1..

It 1e ..~,

n11 to II1U.'4er loaeoM. wbether that . . .0De 1. Ul _borll
u __ 4 • •oer ,..tleat. or ,be teller
lot ,1.

_~

W-"

s.a .. nellhborhoOd "bank.

..11 to pnetloe art1tlolal b1rth coDtrol, both

tor r1 . . . .4 poor. la .aaeral. wbattrt'er aot1_ lAdl WI '0 01U'
\ll,l.__ eAd, 004. 1. aoNllI' lOOd; wba.....r aot1oa _tel'8

tNa ',., 8.4 18 ..r-111 ....11. Ye' l'
IIrMll ItOJI&l .Vila q4, 'Mp.tore. 1.D.
):

caD be
8«*8

\18

arltM4 'tbat God

.eUe wUl. thell.

Wba' God d1..NctlJ

nU., ltoweTer, 18 tbat

all

"

•
should reeel..e Ul4

exerol•• bis Ood...aiveD ,1ft or tree.w1ll. God will. &114
operated 1D all aat!..... COIlSi4eN4 1n

'!leU _teml

00-

&.pen.

thea toral ,oodUa. or WiOlte4ne.8, thoush, depeau _ . . .

Brllb'" was,' .ore l1ke17 ,.ten1na to _tural ...118
wbeza he .a14 . . . . .t coulaer tbe. as ,004. W1tbowt

,_Uti_.

tl_ IUs ...... 11

110t tlW.

The be11...1- 111 U1 1Dt1n1te God

_"al8q hol48 that. ra,1DI tlood 18 ....t ...l 41sa8ter.

JJe

Hcopl... CUloer .... ,.a1_1 ....11 . . . .t work to oo_.t.
It hi• • • pta po110, he sri.... 3uI' .e tbe the18t10 t1l11t11'
wou14.

au

works Jut

a.

harc1 to bay. h1II oure4.

\hat t • •e th1qs are ev118 on the natural plau.
, • •"108

ot d1tterent plaae..

tl"'.17) _ lta

OWB

hO'tfeYel'.

..,

Be reaU...

!beN 1. a

18 ..n.l (only Hla-

plaM caa 'be • 8004 1a relatloa to .. h1&Mr

one, It 18 .o. . . .t the ea. a. the ........re • th1q 1n act
_ oae plute oan 'be 111
with "pH to au,ur. the ab-

pot_.,.

.01ut1.,

QOw, \bat

• spu1t_1

.7.

pbJ"s1.1 1lla can ..

UNci

to beDetit . . 111

Yet be 40e. not . . . . t17UC to cong_. thea,

tb.eJ are f aa'u.rallT .pea.k1nI, evU. In shon, he 18 f\tllT
COJlY1a..4 ot the tnth ot S'. Paul' 8 word.. -Por tM" who lO'h

.iD..
.,'

Oe4. 'all ~p worle: '..-'bar _to load" (RO.aD8. VIII. 28) •
. . he .tUl help. buU4 .. tlood _11, • • hill oh114ND "OC1-

-utel, Met

11••, hls dollar to the cancel' tund.

• To aub-
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'roD! a tbeoretioal standpoint, tbeistic ab.olutism, 11ke

other types or ablolutl.s, rezove. all incentlv. top moral
r~ora of the tndlvldual or ot 8oolety ••• Ab.olutl~ holds

tom opt1.!•• which ap11 •• that tbe world 1. alreecl.:y time
ltlsly perteet. It 1. t 18 p.ertee\, why try to iapl'OVCt 1
It
.v.~

t'

ev11 1. really a lood, why try to eliminate ..11.,20

On the contRry, theistic _banlut!. 40es not claim that thIs

pJI•••tworld. 1. altolethe-r perteet, it 1. pert.etl,. w1Iline to
admlt 1all)Ufeotlonl 1ft the un!".,,!.,.

It he.ly admits that Go4,

ob3ecU".ly ,paald"l, could MY'" made at _ell mor... perfect world.

lor clo•• absolutism deny thl. t pbysioal tvl1a are really ev1ls

and try to sugar.coat them •• ,ood. A hvrlcane i. a hl,hten.

for... It can caus. 4"a4tul physical ruin 1n a town, .Ia1, 1n.
nori4a. A. ,\loh 1t 1. a pb111041 evll.

Rowe...er, that •••• bur

r1.&D.

lit,. make the olt1MS'lIJ ot that town rea1tlethat eternal

values

COIle

A8 .uch, It 1s an 1n.trw.lent tor 1004.

ftrat.

Ab.olut1e, tar trom remoying all 1nc.nt1•• tor llIJoral
r.to~J

?ecoID1...

,rot.md. It .pun

tht.

present world as a tr1al and test1n,

DMm OIl,

linee thelr wbole eternity bang. 1n

the bale;nce, to t1ght the lood tllht 1ft this lit., to strive and.

to:r _ . .qatr, tbat tbeir etemal
I~

~ftaN

uy b. exc.edinaly ,reat.

otherworda, because the1stlc abeolutl•• take. into account

,the .~lt ot m.'. exlste08, both b&f'ore and atter death 04

..
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doe. not narrow its view to this present lite, it imparts true
meanine and purpose and enthusiasm to our moral endeavors.

Here

alain, Brightmants position seems to be baled on a talse optimi.
He would insist that God has done as perfect a job on the world
a. a limited God ean do.

:low we on

01.\1"

part should help such a

God .ake the pr•• ent world as perfect as we can. Bo doubt, such
.. vi_ has 1 ts eo.endable points, but there 1s the danger of

mistak1n&

m.~1

tor the end of our existence.

There is dan,er

ot putt1n, an undue empM,1. on the present lite and forg.ttinl
1ts esaential character of a test1n. Iround tor a better life
to

e...

The end ot our existence 1s not to lead a a.ti, com-

tortable lite without carea or .arrows.

It 1s, rather, to b....

com. a. l1ke to God al possible, and treq:uently the best mean'

ot aooompllshlng this 1s th. hard road ot overoom1n, difficult!.
trials, and .elf-love.
(5)

na YDIIIPil3,llJ.

charAS;!;IZ_

Brightman expla1ns th

import of this ob2ection when he .tate.. liThe root ot all the
objeotions to theistic
in A

&bsoluti~

Dllsli faith, whioh

1s that it is a theory found ••

1n turn irows out of

desi~••

found in

cel'ta1n type. of religious experience. lta1 hliet in an infinite

a~~

i. founded

on taith and do •• not take into aecount all the

tact. of experience.
):

It 1s unseientific.

Is this actually true

100

.

Let us take .s an en.mple the 911"'9. 1&11 of St. !ho-

ma. to see whether tbe po.t tlon ot en intlnt t. God 1. l"8$11y .a
u!u.plrloal as some claim.

tence ot God, the .J"JU1lent tl"O. cont1nlency.

the tect of eon-

t1nlency 1s at the eol".' ot every being that ul.ts,
God la.eU.

in.. 8xls-

take tb$ third ,"of for

thts proof look. at

.!!'lid.

trom

"'.l"'f creature that has exlst.

or 1. e:d..tine or can uilt, ."ery flowe,., even sur, every
man, evena.bn, trom. AnalYllnl the•• empincal cont1nc-t b~

1ngs 1t 1"1'8. to the one nece.sary beinl, God. !he sas. 1. true
of the ."C'U.lleftU trom- cause and cot1on.

!he•• aqua,ents look at

the -.pIneal tact. at oause aa4 IaOtion thet entel" into

etay lty...

tact.

rroa..

OUt" ttY.

CODlide,..tlO1l of the•• ooncret., Individual

*. artfWlCiGt a4.sllc..

to tbe natu.e ot .au.. and motion,

troa tbtl analyal. of the nature

or

the two it conclud •• t'M:t

theH aUI' be a "r.t·Vno_u.s. Cau.e,

I.

Certalnl,.

Prime IIOV81'.

such rlasonlng cannot be branded unempirloal.

In the fourth

~h11o.oph.rl.

looktnc at the

and fiftb arJU8eQta, echola,tle

11'ad$. of b ....llty and the peJ'feotlon 11'1 beinl' about

th.,

and

ren.etinlon the order in .on-intellectual beinl' aad 11'1 the
urt1..... as a :wbole, anive at God '[}reel.ely because they fin.d
in ;Jl~ the tN. Dlealfti

th_.
tact~:

ot the _plr1cal facts that

aunou_d

the que.tion could be tntt. Do•• Briabtman take
lnto coftaldettatlon.

\

AU. the

Doe.- he ••• baTond the .urrae•••an-

inc of everyday oantina.nt b$lnl to so••thinl

.te~,l'

Bather.

...
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doe. not he seeem to be the one who 1s tailing here to live up
to the standard he has set tor himself, na.mely, to oonsider all
the tacts'

In philosophical considerations there 1s the necessity
01' making sure that one has the true facts and as many of them

as it is possible to attain.

searoh out the meaning

01'

But above and beyond this, we must

these tacts·.

It 1. ne'•• sary to eon-

sider them trom every angle, to let beneath their sutface meaning and Irasp their true significance.

this same ple. in

Brightman himselt makes

lhI Prrd21g .9.t. i9,slt

So with GodJ you may constantly be dealing with tacts that
0 ••• trom. h1It. yet entlrely miss finding him. W. )JUst get
away from the pedantic worship ot mer.e. tacts, heret I su.p•• ' , the protessor and the businessman otten coma t the
.... errol'. They otten C1!1', 'Lett, let down to the taets'Yee, by aU means, but unl•• s W. oan ,ind out what the taotll
••an, what they point to, what they are worth, all the taotl
in the world 1'1111 be usel..,s to us. 22
It would •••• that Prote •• or Brightman h.s unwittingly
fallen into the snare about which he is warning other..
oo~.idered

He hal

the empirical facts, but has failed to see their ulti·

mate .1Inifleance.

He has1nvestigated the evils in the world,

but. not entirely, not from an eternal viewpoint.

He has become

;

lo.tin the problem of good.and-evil.

The only solution he has

seen to this problem is the one offered

by

f'initism..

The prin-

cipal dlfticultyot Brightman, it appears, is a metaphysical one

lOB

..

tall to 1'...11•• tbat tM _1D que.tl_ 1n ph1loa.pbJ'
1. the ,ue.tlO1l of beiq. :s. las· eo_ 1ft ooata.et with tho'WlaD.d.
ot ooatlllp.t lMt1q8. .... la, ...... pen.trated to the true 8111'11fl... or their ooat1raCeaer. 'thi8 the tbe rea._ be . . . . . .
tha • •t_.at: -It 1. vue \hat tbere 18 DO real taft whlob .
taka 'bJ It.lAt, 18 coaolu1.... endeD. tbat God. 18 real.-a
Be ..... to

Dl1 1. true. i t
oo"'~

..

.peald.q

"

JSr1&h"~

_u

wen ..a trOll 0-.1'

or

,

80

et1.4. . . . 'but fro•.the

_0111'"' 1ft. bU. wrlt1Dl'. he 18

Ul7 .'f1.4eaoe, 41ftot

OOIlclU1oal are

.klD

_eenala. _

'

OJ'

1rJ41reet.. TUs ..18 wbr. h1.

he 1.

t01'.«

to a4a1t tt<tbat

t1aal 1ftt.U.nual ...t.U.at7' 18 lapoaslbl•• • 84 It 18 wbJ he

._'. at tbe ead. ot h18 ••uch, _ke tile follow2.q &41118.1011:
heJ:l1l the ovto. . ot

OV . .arch

tor God.

.1' -1 '- ,bat

we ..... S. . 41111 ,. aa4 ftOuclr. 1l\tt we bav.
.... 40 .no .oM tMn '-11 wta, we haft toa4.

JlOt . ., ... . . . tcnm4 ..eau.,

sear_a

and

1II'.tnhIr or

1a aeiteP n..,.r to the 41-

nae 'Mia cm17 004 hSJaIeltDOWI.

In 'IUs tMlls I then, .---tbins ot tbe ...~ of

Prot••• or ..1P'... ·s po.ltlOl'l haa be.n .... lilT .. 'brSMt coulderet10a ot til. theoriA. ot . . . . 11111, and I . .a. fte proot, Prof •••or lr1cl\taD ott• .,.. tor tbe uln._or 004 are 8\'1oh that
'll., ...

oalT lea4 to • t1n1t. God. fbe att:plbQ• • M

sa ' ....
. I:
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M Br1&htaan.
II

INA ••

nt. l'I*&nl It bAt

1• •

't.

_1ftta,ln.

•
U#,." 1a 004 _ " shOWJl to pre.uppo•• an4 refleo" the 4ootl'U.

!tie probl_ of ,004~-"11 bal bee

of theiRl' t1lt1tl...

ar--"

".a~,-.n's

Bat l' ba...... lbo1ta

1DC ..

,"*t •

Bltt_,....·• taU. . to

thi• •,.....

ot au4 n1J...... alao aot.4.
.Q1a_t1~ ••OM

tor hol•.u-c tat G04 1. t1a1te.•
tala. 0,,114. . \1I'14••U•• h1. th1Dlt-

Ha.Oll

or

On the

otM~

»NY. the

.nlta.,.

"4, ......,.'ble

thee boa PHte ••or 1Ps.p,... h1_lt i

ot ...11 ill the
....14; IIoal en1 1. 4.· '0 '*e treecl_ of . . fl rill. G04 11
d1Mo\1J tha . . . . of all _tlt1. . beiDI _ tiOt ot aU pnvalaw . . . . . . . . . .4 t. llltel"P"' the exlst__

.e

t1oal,. alB...... "'81..1 ..11 1. a pr1Yatlon. GOd oemlot be

"'""'lI' . .

be14
18 . . . . . . ,
-.1

w

U

s,...lble.. God eaa Ul4 does
" l e a l . .U.
to eorrblb1tt. t. tbe hi'-r po4ot·u ·1Il41v14

poup .t 1D41v14\1al1l. III the ani.l

wor14~

... haye

.a.

t . ., the _ _ ,004 18 \0 be coa.1de..4 'bef'o,.. the 1004 of the

s.acu.v14'Ual.1_1.,

F1nallf. Brllhtaan" thM17 .ot .Da OitUD ha

. . . conll"", ...

~"'ote.

al 'UIlteaable. au_it 1apl1e. a

-.'1'&41ot1_.

'0

ta .hoJt', bote.eor DriPt-- baa laUe4
prow the
,
_,.••1" ..0£ f1lt1\..... in God. lor baa --114l1 __bUs.d
.,

pe.".

as' be ~1rt1t. 1Il oretel' to ••• a suttle1••' rea.. 80J.lJtor .,... .... ex1stea... or tbat of the 1'IOrlct Sonwb.1eh we U,...
Qe4

s... of 0.4 1 •. OOJlt1Dpllt. •• t1n1te bei.q 01' 1at1.Jlt\
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series ot tinite contingent beings can validly explain the existence ot other contingent bein,s.

The reason is simply that the

must look to another being tor their own existence.

From the

tact ot existing contingent being. the existence ot a Necessary
Beinl, the One dependent on nothing else tor existence, ls prove •
This lece •• ary Beina is called God.

And this God must be intl.

ni te in aU respeots, tor otherwise He is not a Beinl that 1.

Necessary with respect

to existenoe itselt"

OtherwiJe, He would

take on, in this or that lrespect, the nature ot .. cont1ngent being.

Although we,oannot .gre. with Protessor Brightman'.
pOSition, we can and do admire the sincerity and earnestness ot
h1s quest tor God and tor truth.

Undoubtedly, he puts God in th

toremo.t place ot importance in his philosophy) atter reading hi
wO:l'k., "e can reasOna bi, suppo.e that he hal done the same in

his own personal lite.

He has undertaken his study and invest!.

lationa to protect the honor ot God and the cause ot religion.

His conclusion to lh!

'W.
f

expr••• es a thought to whie

can all &11'••, one which ..e can all hope to tollcnn
'

~

'1Dd~1 ~ ~

Yet there is one thing that all may know. it God eXist, at
,all., there 1s _ore to learn about his nature and his pu.r-

'po... than stand. ni tten in any book or has been thoU,lht
by

any human mind.

Kay

this prospect ot growth.

I~

never close our minds against

•
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